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Predicting Administrative Patent 
Challenges 
Talia Bar* and Brendan Costello† 
Abstract 
In this Article, we empirically study the use of administrative 
validity challenges by defendants in patent infringement suits. 
By requesting an administrative challenge, defendants can 
effectively bifurcate a patent infringement suit, staying district 
court proceedings while they challenge the validity of the patent 
at the patent office. Because of potential advantages in cost, 
speed, and legal standards, administrative challenge procedures 
like inter partes review appear facially attractive to defendants 
and have been heralded by scholars as a way to reduce litigation 
costs and improve the patent system. 
Despite all of the potential benefits, we find that district court 
defendants requested an administrative challenge—inter partes 
reexamination or inter partes review—of less than ten percent of 
the approximately sixty thousand patents litigated between 2008 
and 2015. Some of the low challenge rate can be explained by 
statutory ineligibility and changes in the standard for the joinder 
of multiple defendants. But much of the low challenge rate 
appears driven by speedy resolutions of the underlying dispute: 
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over fifty percent of the cases where defendants did not use a 
challenge settled or otherwise terminated within one year. 
Our results have three important implications. First, we 
discover trends that can inform the design and evaluation of 
administrative challenge procedures. We find substantial 
evidence that the 2011 America Invents Act reform increased the 
use of administrative challenges by defendants. Still, the reform 
had heterogeneous, possibly unintended effects. Small entity 
patents, for example, are less likely to be challenged after the AIA 
than before. We also identify areas ripe for future reform. Despite 
growing policy concern over patent assertion entities (PAEs), for 
example, patents asserted by PAEs are currently less likely to face 
an administrative challenge than other similar patents. Second, 
we empirically test several predictions in a growing theoretical 
literature on the interaction between Article III courts and 
administrative venues. We confirm an important earlier result: a 
defendant’s decision to request an administrative challenge 
appears highly sensitive to the district in which the defendant is 
sued. Pushing further, we also discover sensitivity to the 
particular judge assigned. Third, we caution that a growing 
empirical literature on the outcomes of inter partes review may 
be clouded by selection bias. We find some evidence that the cases 
where defendants use administrative challenges involve patents 
of particularly high value compared to other litigated patents, 
when the latter are not settled early. Our selection models provide 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, Congress has created procedures 
that allow third parties to challenge the validity of a granted 
patent at the patent office instead of an Article III court.1 Such 
administrative patent challenges can be especially useful to 
district court defendants who seek to render infringement moot 
by proving that the asserted patent is invalid. By requesting an 
administrative challenge and an associated stay of litigation, 
defendants can effectively bifurcate the trial,2 and take 
 
 1. Congress first created inter partes reexamination (IPX) in 1999 and the 
2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act replaced IPX with inter partes review 
(IPR), which took effect in 2012. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999); Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2011). 
 2. See generally Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis 
of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218 
(2016) (comparing the U.K. and German systems and calling for further 
research to investigate the effects of bifurcation in the U.S.). 
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advantage of substantially decreased cost,3 increased speed,4 
and more favorable legal standards at the patent office.5 
Scholars have trumpeted the potential of administrative 
challenges to “fix patent office errors”6 and yield billions of 
dollars of welfare gains by invalidating bad patents and avoiding 
litigation costs.7 
As the number of administrative challenges requests has 
increased dramatically in recent years,8 a growing body of 
empirical work has emerged to analyze the use of the most 
popular administrative challenge: inter partes review.9 In an 
important early contribution, Professors Vishnubhakat, Rai, 
and Kesan provide a high-level look at the use of inter partes 
review during its first three years.10 They find that while a 
 
 3. Median civil litigation costs range from $650,000 to $2.5 million, which 
is substantially greater than the estimated costs of inter partes reexamination 
($128,000) or inter partes review ($487,000). Economics and Logic of Patent 
Litigation Versus Post Grant/Inter Partes Patent Review, RATNERPRESTIA, 
https://www.ratnerprestia.com/2012/10/03/economics-and-logic-of-patent-
litigation-versus-post-grantinter-partes-patent-review/ (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020) (citing the 2011 AIPLA report); IPRs: Reality Amid the Pyrotechnics, RPX 
CORPORATION, https://www.rpxcorp.com/2015/07/02/iprs-reality-amid-the-
pyrotechnics/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge 
and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and 
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 
968–969 (2004). 
 7. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Separating 
Patent Wheat from Chaff: Would the U.S. Benefit from Adopting a Patent Post-
Grant Review?, 43 RES. POL’Y 1649 (2014) (concluding that the U.S. may benefit 
from adopting the post-grant review if the costs are controlled). 
 8. Compare U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION HISTORICAL STATISTICS (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stat
s_roll_up.pdf (noting 168 IPX filings in fiscal year 2008), with U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS (June 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180630.
pdf (noting 1,117 IPR filings in fiscal year 2018). 
 9. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Shawn P. Miller & Shawn Ambwani, 
Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence from Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 
90 COLO. L. REV. 67 (2019) (looking at outcomes of inter partes review); Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual 
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2016) 
(providing a high-level look at filings in district court and IPR for the period 
from 2011 to 2015); Brian Love & Shawn Awbwani, Inter Partes Review: An 
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014) (looking at 
statistics of the first two years of IPR). 
 10. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9. 
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majority of inter partes review requests are filed by district court 
defendants, only a small minority of district court defendants file 
such challenges.11 In this Article, we build on this foundational 
work by constructing a comprehensive database of all 
administrative challenges filed over a decade. We expand the 
scope of the earlier study to include three more years of inter 
partes review requests (through 2018) and also consider earlier 
administrative challenges—inter partes reexamination 
requests—filed between 2008 and 2012. This allows us to 
observe broad trends in administrative challenge use over time 
and any changes that occurred after the passage of the American 
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).12 Importantly, we also expand the 
depth of the analysis to consider not just challenge filings but 
also important characteristics of the district court cases that 
usually precede administrative challenges. We collect data on 
parties, judges, and patents in order to identify which 
characteristics best predict whether a defendant will use an 
administrative challenge in a given case. 
Our comprehensive study into the use of administrative 
challenges by district court defendants has implications in three 
broad areas of policy. First, understanding how defendants 
actually use administrative challenge procedures can help 
inform the design, evaluation, and refinement of these 
procedures. Empirical work can identify, for example, whether 
cases of particular policy interest are using administrative 
procedures. In particular, administrative patent review systems 
could have differential effects on small entity inventors, which 
may be particularly sensitive to the cost of litigation and have 
been shown to be “at a significant disadvantage in protecting 
their patent rights.”13 The rise of patent assertion entities 
(PAEs)—firms that profit from acquiring patents and enforcing 
patent rights instead of using them to make actual products—
 
 11. See id. at 69 (finding that from 2011 to 2015, 86.7% of patents 
challenged in IPR (or the more rarely used covered business method review) 
were also being litigated in the federal courts, but that only “15.2% of litigated 
patents were also being challenged at the PTAB”); see also id. at 46 (finding that 
seventy percent of IPR petitioners follow the “standard model” where district 
court defendants subsequently bring an IPR). 
 12. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 311 (2011). 
 13. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped? 47 J.L. & ECON. 45 
(2004) (finding that “small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in 
protecting their patent rights” compared to patentees with a large portfolio of 
patents). 
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has generated significant concern.14 Policymakers might want to 
design the system in a way that encourages defendants in suits 
brought by PAEs to challenge the asserted patent. 
Most concretely, Congress passed a major reform to the 
administrative patent challenge system under the AIA. The AIA 
replaced the system of administrative challenges that had 
existed since 1999—inter partes reexamination—with an 
entirely new procedure called inter partes review.15 Empirical 
study of the use of these procedures could determine whether 
this reform had its intended effects, or whether it altered the use 
of administrative challenges in unexpected ways. Our study 
informs each of these elements of policy design and evaluation: 
we separate out small entity patents, PAE cases, and the periods 
before and after the AIA for particular scrutiny. 
Second, understanding a defendant’s choice of venue is 
important in its own right. A separate literature has emerged to 
consider “strategic decision making” between administrative 
challenges and Article III courts.16 Some scholars and 
practitioners have theorized about when litigants should request 
an administrative challenge. Perhaps most notably, existing 
literature has stressed the interplay between administrative 
challenges and settlement negotiations, arguing that actually 
filing a challenge might counterintuitively reduce a defendant’s 
leverage when the parties are looking to settle.17 Scholars have 
suggested that defendants behave differently when before a 
particular court or presiding judge,18 and that defendants are 
better off before the patent office when the patent or the prior 
art “involves complex technology.”19 However, few if any of these 
theories have been compared with observed behavior. In this 
 
 14. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion 
Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 651 (2014) (surveying concerns 
associated with PAEs). 
 15. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2011). 
 16. We borrow this phrase from one of the most important existing studies 
on this topic. See generally Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9. 
 17. Cf. Roger Shang & Yar Chaikovsky, Inter Partes Reexamination of 
Patents: An Empirical Evaluation, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2006). Note 
that this suggestion is based in the IPX regime, where challenges are much 
more difficult to terminate than in IPR. This is one of the reasons that IPR 
might be more appealing than IPX, which we discuss further in Part II. 
 18. See id. at 21–22. (discussing judge and jury-dependent considerations 
that a defendant might take into account in a patent action). 
 19. Id. 
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paper, we test these hypotheses, asking how these factors are 
associated with challenge rates in the real world. 
Third, our Article helps to provide needed context to existing 
empirical literature. While important, the growing body of 
empirical work has primarily focused on observed challenges, 
noting that both procedures have invalidated the vast majority 
of patent claims before them,20 with only high-quality patents 
managing to survive.21 To accurately understand the effects of 
administrative challenge procedures, we must first understand 
when and how they are used. The fact that defendants only 
rarely use administrative challenges22 raises the question of 
whether observed challenges are at all representative of the 
broader world of patent disputes.23 Would high invalidation 
rates be surprising if only the lowest quality patents were 
challenged at the patent office?24 Does the observation that 
certain patents fare better or worse in administrative challenges 
hinge on these patents being over- or under-represented relative 
to district court litigation? Questions of selection bias thus pose 
a serious hurdle to the evaluation of administrative review 
procedures.25 In this Article, we attempt to model these selection 
 
 20. See, e.g., Love & Ambwani, supra note 9; Shang & Chaikovsky, supra 
note 17. 
 21. See, e.g., Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 68 (finding empirical 
results that “suggest that inter partes review is, as Congress intended, 
eliminating patents that appear to be of relatively low quality”). 
 22. See Section II infra. 
 23. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. L. STUD. 1 (1984) (examining the differences between cases 
resolved in the settlement process and those that are litigated to a definite 
verdict). 
 24. See Colleen Chien, Christian Helmers & Alfred Spigarelli, Inter Partes 
Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
817, 844 (2018) (arguing that “any invalidation rates must be understood in 
context, as the share of invalidated patents among all patents whose validity 
was challenged is the result of a number of selection mechanisms, both as 
imposed by the U.S. tribunal in the case of the institution decision and by the 
parties, through their decisions to settle”). 
 25. See, e.g., Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 161 (“[W]e 
nonetheless acknowledge that our findings likely reflect some degree of 
selection bias . . . .”). A notable exception is Talia Bar & Brendan Costello, 
Patent Validity Challenges and the America Invents Act (U.Conn. Dep’t Econ. 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 2017-21R, 2018), a companion paper to 
this piece. In that work, we employ a selection model to control for selection bias 
in an evaluation of IPX and IPR outcomes. That paper only deals with selection 
incidentally, using a small sample of cases to mechanically control for selection 
bias in a narrow window around the AIA policy change. Here, by contrast, we 
substantively engage with the question of selection: presenting the legal 
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effects, so that future literature on the effects of inter partes 
review can understand and account for them. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, 
we provide background information on the system of 
administrative patent challenges, compare these procedures 
with litigation, and survey existing literature. In Part III, we 
draw upon that background to formulate several hypotheses 
about the ways in which defendants use administrative 
challenges. We argue that the district and judge in the 
infringement case are likely to have a substantial effect on the 
decision to request an administrative challenge. Further, we 
expect that cases leading to administrative challenges are those 
cases that are unlikely to settle early. As a corollary, we expect 
cases involving PAEs to result in challenges less frequently. 
Because the AIA introduced both changes that are appealing to 
potential challengers, and changes that are unappealing to 
potential challengers, we argue that certain cases should have 
been far more impacted by the reform than others. 
In Part IV, we present the methodology of our study and a 
preliminary look at the rate of administrative challenge use. The 
base of our dataset is sixty thousand patents litigated between 
2008 and 2015. Each observation is a patent-case, meaning that 
if a number of patents were asserted under one case number, we 
split them into separate observations for each asserted patent. 
We then match each patent-case to any inter partes 
reexamination or inter partes review requests of the same 
patent filed by one of the parties to litigation within eighteen 
months. We find that less than ten percent of cases lead to a 
challenge. A portion of this low rate can be explained by 
statutory ineligibility: removing patents litigated during the 
pre-AIA period that were ineligible for inter partes 
reexamination by statute, we find that the rate of challenges 
rises slightly among eligible cases, but still remains fewer than 
one in ten. We also find that the raw statistics are misleading 
due to changes in defendant joinder under the AIA, which tend 
to separate what would have usually been one case into multiple 
cases. Controlling for joinder changes, our best estimate of the 
challenge rate rises to just eleven percent, or just over one in ten. 
 
theories underlying selection between an Article III court and an administrative 
challenge, and testing each theoretical prediction against a sample several 
times larger, in order to generalize about selection patterns across a broader 
era. 
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Still, the rate of challenge use appears to be increasing over the 
sample period. 
Our data does not allow us to disaggregate the reasons why 
defendants decline to file administrative challenges in nine of 
every ten cases. As a theoretical matter, not every defendant will 
have a colorable challenge to validity that falls within the scope 
of an IPX/IPR petition; the rate of challenge within the set of 
cases with reasonably strong validity challenges might be 
considerably higher. Further, our data lends support for one 
simple explanation for why many cases do not lead to challenges: 
over half of the non-challenged cases in our sample settled or 
otherwise terminated early within one year. 
In Part V we consider the effect of the infringement suit 
venue on the decision to request an administrative challenge. 
We find significant heterogeneity across districts. Even within 
the top twenty-five most common districts, challenge rates range 
from about one in five to two out of every hundred. Importantly, 
these differences persist even within a district, as there are 
significant differences in challenge rates across particular 
judges. Part of this effect could be explained by differences in 
docket management, where certain judges deter challenges by 
moving quickly or pushing the parties into an early settlement. 
In Part VI we look deeper into the patents at-issue in cases 
that result in administrative challenges. We find that both 
intrinsic and acquired characteristics of the underlying patents 
are important predictors of administrative challenge. In 
particular, we find some support for the idea that challenged 
patents are of especially high value when compared to other 
litigated patents, when the latter patents remain in district 
court litigation for at least a year. We find that both small entity 
patents and patents asserted by PAEs are less likely to be 
challenged administratively. However, both of these results can 
be explained by early settlements. 
Finally, in Part VII we find some empirical evidence to 
support the visual observation of increased administrative 
challenges since the passage of the America Invents Act. 
Controlling for observed patent characteristics, we find that 
patents that were litigated after September 16, 2012, when the 
AIA took effect, were more likely to be challenged 
administratively. This suggests that parties to litigation are 
more willing to use inter partes review than they were to use 
inter partes reexamination. Further, we find evidence that not 
only the prevalence but also the selection of administratively 
challenged patents changed in the post-AIA period. 
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II. THE PROS AND CONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
CHALLENGES 
In this Part, we provide a background on the venues of 
validity challenge in the United States, from district court, to 
inter partes reexamination, and concluding with inter partes 
review. We consider the benefits and drawbacks to use of each 
procedure by litigants, with a particular emphasis on alleged 
infringers (defendants in an infringement suit). Along the way, 
we also survey the existing literature and note relevant 
empirical findings. In the Appendix, we present a summary of 
the information described in this Part as Table A1. 
A. THE BASELINE: DISTRICT COURT 
Several patent systems in the world allow third parties to 
challenge the validity of granted patents as one measure aimed 
at improving patent quality.26 For most of its history, the United 
States was not one of them. After a patent was deemed valid and 
issued in the original examination process, the role of the patent 
office was largely over.27 Challenges to the validity of issued 
patents were instead made in the district courts.28 Of course, the 
set of patents that are litigated in district courts is likely to be 
heavily selected. Earlier studies have shown that both 
acquired29 and intrinsic30 characteristics of patents are 
 
 26. The most notable example is the European Patent Office (EPO). For 
background and an empirical study on the use of so-called patent opposition at 
the EPO, see Dietmar Harhoff & Markus Reitzig, Determinants of Opposition 
Against EPO Patent Grants—The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 
22 INT’L J.INDUS. ORG. 443 (2004). 
 27. One notable exception was the existence of reissue patents, where the 
validity of the patent again became the subject of inquiry for the patent office, 
and third parties could submit evidence of invalidity during the reissue 
examination. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“A protest 
was filed during prosecution of appellant’s reissue application which included 
[invalidating prior art].”). 
 28. In the typical case we consider here, the parties seeking invalidation 
are the defendants in an infringement suit. It is, of course, possible for these 
parties to be the plaintiff if they begin a lawsuit for declaratory judgment. 
 29. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 283 (2011) (investigating factors that predict whether a particular patent 
will be litigated and discovering that the important predictors of litigation 
include so-called “acquired characteristics” of a patent that are realized after its 
issuance, such forward citations and assignment). Note that Professor Chien’s 
article inspired the title for this Article. 
 30. See generally Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics 
of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001) 
(finding that significant predictors of litigation include both intrinsic 
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important in predicting litigation; these characteristics tend to 
suggest that litigated patents are of broader scope and higher 
value relative to all issued patents.31 
When dragged into district court by a patent holder, a 
defendant may counter with a common defense to infringement: 
that the patent claims at-issue are invalid.32 For hundreds of 
years, the judicial branch has been in the business of 
invalidating patents.33 The Patent Act explicitly contemplates 
this defense.34 One district court, in considering the bar for 
defending on ground of invalidity, argued that “[n]o federal court 
of appeals has considered how the Twombly and Iqbal decisions 
apply to patent invalidity counterclaim or affirmative defense 
pleadings” and that “[d]istrict courts . . . have reached 
conflicting results.”35 By contrast, one study has found that most 
courts typically do apply Iqbal and Twombly in cases of 
counterclaims, but concedes that there is less clarity on which 
standards apply to defenses.36 In any event, it appears clear that 
 
characteristics, including claims, and acquired characteristics that describe the 
patent owner); Alan C. Marco & Richard D. Miller, Patent Examination Quality 
and Litigation: Is There a Link?, 26 INT’L J. OF ECON. OF BUS. 65, 87 (2019) 
(finding evidence that broader patents are more likely to be involved in 
litigation, identifying several examination markers that help predict litigation, 
and finding that several of the “most impactful variables are defined prior to 
any examination”). 
 31. See Marco & Miller, supra note 30, at 82, 87. 
 32. Of course, the defendant could also argue non-infringement, or allege a 
number of other affirmative defenses created by statute or the courts. See 
PETER MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 404 (2017) (noting the existence 
of other court-recognized defenses such as experimental use). 
 33. See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co, 159 U.S. 465 
(1895) (holding in an infringement suit for an electric light patent in broader 
Edison-Sawyer/Mann contest that a patent by Sawyer-Mann was invalid 
because its description was too broad to enable someone to create the bulb 
without “painstaking experimentation”); see also B. Zorina Khan, Property 
Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. ECON. 
HIST. 58, 70–85 (1995) (providing a general discussion of patenting and the legal 
system in the United States). 
 34. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (listing “invalidity of the patent . . . on any 
ground specified in part II as a condition of patentability” as one of the “defenses 
in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent”). 
 35. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co., No. 1:10-cv-3008-AT, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135675 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011). See generally Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007). 
 36. Conrad Gosen & Tasha Francis, The Confusing and Often 
Contradictory World of Pleading Defenses and Counterclaims in Patent Cases, 
IPO L.J. (2015). See also Sarah E. Jack, Note, Restoring Equilibrium: Why 
Twombly and Iqbal Should Apply to All Pleadings in Patent Cases, 103 IOWA L. 
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the standard applied will be less than or equal to Iqbal and 
Twombly. 
Assuming the case has now survived a motion to dismiss, 
under whatever standard the court applies, the burden now falls 
on the defendant to prove invalidity.37 This burden can be 
substantial, as patents challenged in the district court are 
presumed valid by statute.38 Further, the standard for proof is 
“clear and convincing evidence”—higher than the typical 
preponderance of the evidence standard in civil litigation.39 Still, 
defendants attempting to prove invalidity have ample 
opportunities to do so. The set of invalidating evidence at this 
stage can generally relate to any ground that would have been a 
condition of patentability.40 And, as in any civil action, the 
parties often engage in significant discovery, and can retain 
experts to testify. 
Of course, this evidence is rarely presented at trial, because 
trials rarely occur. Consistent with litigation generally, the vast 
majority of patent suits settle before a decision on the merits can 
be reached.41 Even when a decision on the merits is reached, it 
need not be at trial. Rather, the court might decide issues of 
validity by summary judgement. In fact, when courts do reach a 
decision on validity, they typically do so at an earlier procedural 
stage than infringement.42 Still, we note that this reality does 
not necessarily undermine our claims regarding cost.43 Kesan 
 
REV. 1301 (2018) (finding that “[c]ourts only inconsistently apply plausible 
pleading to counterclaims and affirmative defenses”). 
 37. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a 
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 38. See id. (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). 
 39. MENELL ET AL., supra note 32. 
 40. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (One defense is “invalidity of the patent . . . on 
any ground specified in part II as a condition of patentability”). See also MENELL 
ET AL., supra note 32, at 209 (examining assertions of invalidity by particular 
grounds, including utility, obviousness, double-patenting, and inappropriate 
inventorship). 
 41. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases 
Resolved—An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of 
Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (noting that 
“approximately 80% of patent cases settle”). 
 42. See id. at 277 (finding that “rulings of invalidity tend to occur at an 
earlier procedural stage compared with rulings of infringement”). 
 43. Recall that an inordinate amount of expenses are still realized even if 
a case settles or ends in summary judgement immediately after discovery. See 
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 
(2015) [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT], http://files.ctctcdn.com/ 
e79ee274201/b6ced6c3-d1ee-4ee7-9873-352dbe08d8fd.pdf (comparing median 
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and Ball explicitly caution that early does not mean cheap: 
“obtaining a pre-trial ruling—particularly pertaining to 
invalidity—can be very expensive in patent cases.”44 
All told, district courts appear to rarely invalidate patents—
only about two percent of cases result in the invalidation of one 
or more patent claims.45 This is largely driven by the fact that 
courts rarely adjudicate validity at all; Lemley and Allison find 
that when ruling, courts hold patents valid 54 percent of the 
time.46 Because the court fails to adjudicate validity in a vast 
majority of cases, we might expect that many invalid patents are 
left in the economy. 
B. INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 
Aware of the tremendous cost of litigating a patent dispute 
in the district courts, Congress has acted over the last four 
decades to create a series of administrative alternatives to 
determine validity.47 In 1999, the American Inventors Protection 
Act (AIPA) created inter partes reexamination (IPX), an 
administrative proceeding that could be used to adjudicate 
validity.48 Compared to existing ex parte reexamination, this 
new procedure allowed more participation by the requesting 
party.49 While the AIPA created IPX to run alongside the ex 
 
patent infringement litigation costs through mediation, discovery, and all 
costs). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Kesan & Ball, supra note 41, at 275 (citing data from cases in 1995, 
1997, and 2000). 
 46. Mark A. Lemley & John R. Allison, Empirical Evidence on the Validity 
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
 47. In 1980, Congress created ex parte reexamination to allow parties to 
challenge the validity of a patent in a “relatively inexpensive” way. See Farrell 
& Merges, supra note 6, at 965 (citing congressional transcripts to show that 
Congress was apprised of high-cost district court litigation and its intention was 
for reexamination to be a “relatively inexpensive” alternative to adjudicate 
patent validity). In 1999, this initial procedure was supplemented by the 
creation of inter partes reexamination (IPX). Id. 
 48. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2601 (9th ed., rev. Jan. 2018) (“The 
reexamination statute was amended on November 29, 1999 by the American 
Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (the AIPA), Public Law 106-113. The AIPA 
expanded reexamination by providing an ‘inter partes’ option; it authorized the 
extension of reexamination proceedings via an optional inter partes 
reexamination procedure in addition to the existing ex parte reexamination 
procedure.”). 
 49. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, MPEP § 2609 (8th ed., 
rev. Aug. 2012) (“[A] third party requester may participate throughout the 
proceeding . . . .”). 
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parte system, their relative features made it likely that IPX will 
be the preferred mechanism for third parties, while ex parte 
requests would be used predominantly by patent owners 
themselves seeking to test their patents.50 
A party who wished to institute an IPX must first overcome 
the threshold question of whether they raised a “substantial new 
question of patentability.”51 IPX was denied rarely, only about 
ten percent of the time.52 Further, IPX petitioners could not raise 
the full range of grounds for invalidity and supporting evidence. 
They must only rely on documentary prior art to question 
novelty and nonobviousness.53 Professor Janis notes that this 
restriction practically guaranteed that IPX would “never serve 
as a fully effective alternative to validity litigation,” because it 
excludes invalidity theories like on sale and public use.54 
Once an IPX was instituted, it proceeded before patent 
examiners, similar to the original prosecution, with third parties 
having a right to participate via written comments.55 The patent 
office at this stage considered the validity of the granted claims. 
Once started, this train was difficult to stop. Parties were not 
formally able to settle an IPX midway through—once instituted, 
IPX challenges continued to completion.56 Of course, third 
 
 50. See Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481, 484 (2000) (“Nevertheless, it seems 
likely that the ex parte provisions will become almost exclusively the domain of 
patent owner-initiated reexaminations, and the inter partes provisions will 
become almost exclusively the domain of third-party initiated 
reexaminations.”). 
 51. See MPEP § 2616 (“Under 35 U.S.C. 312 and 313, the Office must 
determine whether ‘a substantial new question of patentability’ affecting any 
claim of the patent has been raised.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999) 
(providing the statutory requirements for petition). 
 52. See Bar & Costello, supra note 25, at 13 (finding IPX denials to be about 
8 percent of all IPX outcomes in a window of time pre-AIA, and 13 percent of all 
outcomes in the last year of IPX before the switch to IPR). 
 53. See MPEP § 2609 (“Prior art considered during reexamination is 
limited to prior patents or printed publications applied under the appropriate 
parts of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 103 . . . .”); see also MPEP § 2660 (“In rejecting 
claims for want of novelty or for obviousness, the examiner must cite the best 
references at his or her command.”). Note, § 102 refers to novelty and § 103 
refers to obviousness. 
 54. Janis, supra note 50, at 487. 
 55. Id. at 490; See also MPEP § 2609 (“[A] third party requester may 
participate throughout the proceeding . . . .”). 
 56. See Shang & Chaikovsky, supra note 17 (“Once a reexamination 
request is filed, the challenger cannot revoke it, and the PTO will 
examine the patent to the finish regardless of settlement status. Therefore, once 
the request is filed, the challenger’s promise to stop participating in 
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parties could settle and then withdraw from participation, 
reducing the IPX to effectively a limited ex parte request.57 Our 
related research on the outcomes of patent challenges indicates 
that over two-thirds of eventual IPX outcomes include at least 
some claims cancellations.58 Our related research also indicates 
that about a quarter include at least some claims confirmations, 
and another quarter include some form of amendment or added 
claims.59 
All told, the IPX procedure was relatively cheap in terms of 
pecuniary cost,60 but could still be very costly in terms of time. 
The median pendency of an IPX from filing to a final 
reexamination certificate is over three years.61 Still, this 
measure is probably biased upwards somewhat due to the fact 
that the certificates are only issued after any appeals. Parties 
could appeal an IPX decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences, and patent owners could appeal further to the 
Federal Circuit.62 
While IPX could be used as a standalone procedure for 
parties to adjudicate the validity of a patent, its potential for use 
alongside litigation was quickly realized. The AIPA includes a 
provision that states that district courts “may” obtain a stay 
“unless the court before which such litigation is pending 
determines that a stay would not serve the interests of justice.”63 
Professor Janis has noted that this provision appears 
unnecessary, as courts already had inherent authority to stay 
litigation in such cases.64 In any event, this provision at least 
 
reexamination will have no settlement value for ex parte proceedings, and 
limited value for inter partes proceedings.”). But see Scott McKeown, Settlement 
Agreements and Patent Reexamination, ROPES & GRAY: PATENTS POST-GRANT 
(Jan. 5, 2012) https://www.patentspostgrant.com/settlement-agreements-
patent-reexamination/ (arguing that in theory settling parties may be able to 
stop an IPX by obtaining a consent order in district court that could trigger IPX 
estoppel, but conceding that “[i]n practice, defendants rarely agree to such a 
consent order . . . ”). 
 57. See id. (“Without the challenger, the inter partes proceeding effectively 
resembles an ex parte proceeding . . . .”). 
 58. Bar & Costello, supra note 25, at 38. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See RATNERPRESTIA, supra note 3. 
 61. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Inter Partes Reexamination Filing 
Data (Sept. 30, 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stat
s_roll_up.pdf. 
 62. MPEP supra note 48. 
 63. 35 U.S.C. § 318 (1999); Janis supra note 50, at 497. 
 64. Janis, supra note 50 at 498. 
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confirms the possibility of bifurcated trials: where pending 
infringement suits are stayed to adjudicate validity at the patent 
office before returning to the district court to determine 
infringement. Gardella and Berger discuss the use of 
reexamination as a strategic tool by alleged infringers to stay 
pending litigation.65 They predict that success in the 
reexamination system will cause patent holders to file narrower 
patents that are less likely to be invalidated in these 
proceedings.66 
Of course, adjudicating validity at the patent office would be 
less meaningful if the parties could then return to the district 
court and have a second bite at the apple. To prevent this, 
Congress attached an estoppel provision meant to prevent 
challengers from “re-litigating a validity issue in court following 
an unsuccessful effort to invalidate through reexamination,” or 
vice versa.67 Rightfully, this estoppel exempts challenge grounds 
that were outside of IPX’s scope by limiting it to arguments the 
requestor “raised or could have raised during the inter partes 
proceedings.”68 Still, Professor Janis categorizes the language of 
the estoppel provisions as overly broad, noting that “the estoppel 
provisions alone may convince many patent owners to avoid 
inter partes reexamination.”69 
Published USPTO statistics indicate that IPX was initially 
slow to be used, but its use steadily grew.70 Only twenty-six inter 
partes reexaminations were filed in its first four years.71 The 
next four years saw a still low 282 filings.72 At least part of IPX’s 
slow start can be explained by statutory restrictions on its use. 
Parties are only able to request IPX on patents filed on or after 
 
 65. See generally Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States 
Reexamination Procedures: Recent Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent 
Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 381 (2009) (“Some are filing 
more reexamination requests in an effort to circumvent the high cost of United 
States patent litigation; this strategy is enabled by the willingness of many 
districts courts to postpone litigation while the reexamination is pending.”). 
 66. Id. at 382. 
 67. Janis supra note 50, at 492. 
 68. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 61 (showing that one 
inter partes reexamination was filed in 2001 and 530 were filed in 2012 with an 
increase every year). 
 71. See id. (showing zero filed in 2000, one filed in 2001, four filed in 2002, 
and twenty-one filed in 2003). 
 72. Id. 
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November 29, 1999.73 Therefore, for the first few years of IPX, 
the set of eligible patents was quite small. Filings appeared to 
be on an upward climb before IPX was discontinued in 2012 by 
the AIA. There were 1,081 IPX filings between 2008 and 2011, 
and 530 in 2012 alone.74 
C. INTER PARTES REVIEW 
In 2011, Congress took another shot at reforming 
administrative challenge procedures with the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act.75 First, the AIA changed the standard for 
granting a request for reexamination, raising the bar from a 
“substantial new question of patentability” to “a reasonable 
likelihood that the requester will prevail with respect to at least 
one claim,”76 which is expected to increase the rate of 
reexamination denials.77 This standard took effect for the final 
year of IPX and remains in effect for IPR.78 
Most notably for our purposes, the AIA discontinued IPX 
effective September 16, 2012.79 In its place, the AIA created a 
tripartite system of inter partes review, post-grant review, and 
 
 73. MPEP § 2609 (“Any third party requester can request inter partes 
reexamination at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent (for 
a patent issued from an original application filed on or after November 29, 
1999) . . . .”). 
 74. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 61. 
 75. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011). Note that 
this law also had many other effects besides those recounted for administrative 
challenge systems, such as changing to a first-to-file regime. 
 76. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes 
review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information 
presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under 
section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would 
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Matthew Phillips & Kevin Laurence, Changes to 
Reexamination Under the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Nov., 
2011), https://www.stoel.com/StoelRives/files/93/9383d92d-ed13-4b0f-8c33-
4a38039fcf2f.pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79. MPEP § 2601 (“The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the 
AIA) . . . was enacted September 16, 2011. Section 6(c) of the AIA replaced the 
inter partes reexamination process, effective September 16, 2012, with a new 
inter partes review process, such that on or after September 16, 2012 the Office 
no longer entertains requests for inter partes reexamination but instead accepts 
petitions to conduct inter partes review.”). 
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covered business method patent review.80 For this study, we 
focus on IPR, as the primary successor to IPX.81 
Compared to IPX, IPR appears closer to litigation and 
farther from original patent prosecution. Unlike IPX, IPR allows 
for the deposition of witnesses and other associated discovery, as 
well as an oral hearing with administrative patent judges.82 
Stahl and Heckenberg explain that “[t]he new review 
proceedings may also be more enticing to a patent challenger 
since they make available to the accused infringer more 
procedures analogous to those available in patent litigation.”83 
Most notably, the AIA has mandated that IPR proceed 
expediently, with an expected overall timing of eighteen months, 
half the time expected of IPX.84 Additionally, in IPX only patents 
filed after November 29, 1999, could be reexamined while in IPR 
this restriction was lifted, expanding the set of patents that can 
be challenged.85 Finally, parties can seek to settle their dispute 
and formally end the IPR process.86 
However, not all changes are beneficial to the requestor. 
Challenges under the AIA have become substantially more 
expensive.87 Furthermore, the estoppel described above has 
 
 80. See 35 U.S.C. § 311–319 (outlining inter partes review); American 
Invents Act § 18 (outlining covered business methods). 
 81. The vast majority of cases in our later-constructed sample are filed 
more than nine months after the patent’s issuance, and are thus ineligible for 
PGR. In some of our analysis, we match on patent class, which should somewhat 
obviate the possibility of CBM within our non-challenged group. 
 82. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, STERN KESSLER GOLDSTEIN FOX, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140402045337/http://ptolitigationcenter.com/wp
-content/uploads/2009/08/ipx-v-ipr.pdf. (outlining the differences between 
hearing characteristics in IPX and IPR). 
 83. Lawrence A. Stahl & Donald H. Heckenberg, The Scope and 
Ramifications of the New Post-Grant and Inter Partes Review Proceedings at the 
USPTO 6 (2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/e4bd1e8a 
-651e-40e2-9f7d-f45e80b9deab.pdf D (last visited May 2, 2020). 
 84. IPR is given statutory time restrictions: six months to reach an 
institution decision (grant or deny), split into a three-month period for patent 
owner response (37 C.F.R. § 42.107) followed by another three-month period for 
USPTO decision (35 U.S.C. § 314). Then another twelve months to reach a final 
determination (cancel, confirm, etc.) (35 U.S.C. § 316). Limited six-month 
extensions can be granted “for good cause shown.” Thus, we would expect most 
IPRs to reach a final decision within eighteen months, or 1.5 years. 
 85. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82, at 1 (stating the 
differences between reexamination criteria in IPX and IPR). 
 86. Id.; see also Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry 
Settlements at the Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30 (2018) (examining 
IPR settlements). 
 87. See RATNERPRESTIA, supra note 3. 
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become more restrictive under IPR. Estoppel now binds earlier 
(before appeals), and restricts both district court and future PTO 
actions.88 
Perhaps even more so than IPX, Congress appears to have 
contemplated IPR as a way to bifurcate litigation. The AIA 
prohibits parties from filing an IPR if they were served with an 
infringement complaint more than one year ago.89 This 
incentivizes parties to avoid redundancy between the district 
court and the patent office by requiring them to quickly file an 
IPR before the district court proceedings has moved too far 
along. 
In one early empirical contribution, Professors Chien and 
Helmers trace the path of a typical inter partes review.90 They 
note, importantly, that the headline number of invalidations in 
IPR must be understood “in context,” as many challenged claims 
are denied review before reaching a final decision.91 In another 
recent contribution, Professors Vishnubhakat, Rai, and Kesan 
provide an important study on the strategic use of IPR by parties 
in litigation.92 They find that the majority (seventy percent) of 
inter partes review validity challenges are brought by district 
court defendants.93 They also note that the Eastern District of 
Texas has a reluctance to grant stays, but that parties from there 
(as well as the District of Delaware and Northern District of 
California) see a disproportionate number of IPR petitions.94 In 
our study, we attempt to expand on this foundational work in 
three ways: (i) by focusing explicitly not just on the court cases 
that led to IPR, but also those that chose not to use it, (ii) by 
using patent characteristics to predict which cases will use IPR, 
and (iii) by including not just IPR filings but IPX filings which 
allows us to examine whether the AIA policy change affected the 
use of administrative proceedings to challenge patent validity. 
Finally, we note as a measure of stakes that the IPR process 
has already generated significant controversy. Its very 
constitutionality was questioned before the Supreme Court, 
 
 88. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82, at 2 (outlining the 
differences between estoppel in IPX and IPR). 
 89. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
 90. See generally Chien, Helmers & Spigarelli, supra note 24. 
 91. Id. at 844. This important insight, however, has no bearing at this 
study, as we look at the filing of an IPR and not its final conclusion. 
 92. See generally Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9. 
 93. Id. at 49. 
 94. Id. at 80. 
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though it eventually survived.95 Likewise, it has been criticized 
on policy grounds, having been referred to as a patent “death 
squad,” accused of having anti-patent slant and harming 
innovators.96 Still, our early research investigating the effect of 
the policy change has found no evidence that the policy change 
introduced a negative bias against the patentee in 
reexamination.97 Controversy aside, IPR seems to be becoming 
increasingly popular. IPR surpassed three thousand requests in 
its first three years—over one thosuand requests more than IPX 
in its entire thirteen-year tenure.98 
III. SELECTION HYPOTHESES: WHO MIGHT PREFER 
WHAT? 
In the last Part, we have shown that litigation, IPX, and IPR 
differ in important respects. Here, we summarize the key 
differences and hypothesize why parties in certain cases may or 
may not choose to use administrative review. 
First, we expect that the rates of administrative challenge 
will vary considerably by district. Other work has shown that 
there is significant evidence of “court shopping” going on in 
patent cases.99 If plaintiffs select into districts depending on 
their litigation strategies, plaintiffs that select into a particular 
district may litigate in particular ways that would push 
defendants toward or away from using an administrative 
challenge. Of course, particular tendencies of the courts might 
also have an effect on defendants’ willingness to request an 
administrative challenge. Districts that are especially hostile to 
stay requests or especially proficient in patent litigation, for 
 
 95. See Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1365, 1369 (2018) (holding that inter partes review does not violate article 
III of the U.S. Constitution). 
 96. See, e.g., Brian Mahoney, Software Patent Ruling a Major Judicial 
Failure, Rader Says, LAW360 (Oct. 25, 2013), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/482264 (quoting Chief Judge Rader, who used 
the “death squad” language in a speech). See also Paul Morinville, How the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board Harms Inventors, IPWATCHDOG, (Sept. 13, 
2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/13/how-the-patent-trial-and-
appeal-board-harms-inventors/id=72554/ (presenting comments describing this 
view of the PTAB). 
 97. See Bar & Costello, supra note 25. 
 98. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL 
BOARD STATISTICS (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30%20PTAB.pdf. 
 99. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 631 (2015). 
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example, might deter use of an administrative challenge.100 This 
latter effect might also persist with respect to individual judges. 
Even within a certain court, a particular judge might have a 
penchant for speedy docket management, or an aversion to 
granting stays.101 We test for differential effects of courts and 
judges in Part V. 
Of course, while particular districts and judges can provide 
constraints on case management, there is still room for 
substantial heterogeneity in litigating strategies. Certain 
classes of plaintiffs might be able to deter administrative 
challenges. Put another way, defendants might be more or less 
willing to use an administrative challenge depending on the type 
of party accusing them of infringement. One obvious factor is the 
desire of parties to reach quick settlements. Cases that settle 
quickly do not meaningfully challenge validity in any venue. 
And, on the other side of the coin, parties that intend to settle 
quickly might not actually request an administrative challenge, 
preferring instead to hold it in front of the plaintiff’s nose as 
leverage.102 Therefore, we might expect that a substantial 
portion of our non-challenged cases were those that simply 
settled quickly. We test this finding in Section IV.D. 
A corollary is that we might expect plaintiffs who wish to 
settle early to deter the filing of an administrative challenge. 
PAEs immediately come to mind, as they have been theorized in 
other work to potentially have “a greater willingness . . . to settle 
litigation.”103 The same might be true of small entity patents, 
but for a different reason. Small entity patentees are those who 
qualified for reduced filing fees at the time of examination, and 
thus might be uniquely unable to bear the costs of litigation. 
They might also, therefore, seek early settlement, and the 
litigation might cease prior to the filing of an administrative 
challenge by defendants. Of course, this presumes that the 
plaintiff asserting the patent was the original patentee—in 
Section VI we test for the small entity and PAE effects alongside 
an indicator for patent re-assignment prior to litigation. 
There is also good reason to expect that characteristics of 
the patent at-issue might affect the decision to challenge the 
patent’s validity in district court versus at the patent office. One 
 
 100. See Shang & Chaikovsky, supra note 17, at 23–24. 
 101. Id at 23. 
 102. Id at 26. 
 103. Mazzeo et al., Do NPEs Matter? Non-Practicing Entities and Patent 
Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON 879, 881 (2013). 
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paper suggests that the patent office would be preferred when 
the patent or the relevant prior art “involves complex 
technology.”104 While certain inventions in any technology area 
can, of course, be very complex, or very simple, this advice would 
tend to suggest differences across technology categories in the 
rate of administrative challenge use. A defendant might find it 
easier to explain, for example, a mechanical invention to a 
generalist judge or lay jury rather than a complex algorithm. By 
contrast, areas that might fit particularly well to jury 
nullification—such as invalidating the patent for an expensive 
drug—might seem more favorable to challenge in the district 
court. In Section VI, we test for differential challenge rates 
across patent technology categories. 
As we have seen, there are several benefits and drawbacks 
to IPR as compared with IPX. In particular, IPR is more 
advantageous to parties sensitive to the cost of time, but less 
preferred by parties particularly sensitive to pecuniary costs. 
Clearly, the bar for instituting an administrative challenge is 
higher than the low bar for alleging invalidity in the district 
court; this difference is even more pronounced post-AIA. Parties 
who seek to challenge validity simply to leverage a settlement, 
without strong grounds of actual invalidity, may prefer to 
remain in district court, rather than apply for IPX/IPR and get 
denied. Further, parties who expect to settle may have been 
unlikely to request IPX, as it restricted the ability of settlement 
to end the dispute. This concern is limited in IPR, which allows 
settlements. All else equal, we would expect this shift to increase 
the number of parties requesting IPR compared with IPX. 
Clearly, though, one takeaway is that IPR is not universally 
beneficial to all defendants relative to IPX. Parties may be 
especially sensitive to one of its beneficial or detrimental 
provisions. Therefore, we might expect to see highly 
heterogeneous effects of the AIA, with certain parties and types 
of cases more quickly flocking to IPR than others. 
IV. HOW MANY CASES RESULT IN CHALLENGES? 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The base of our dataset is patent litigation filings. We 
collected data on litigation from DocketNavigator,105 searching 
 
 104. See Shang & Chaikovsky, supra note 17, at 22. 
 105. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://docketnavigator.com. 
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for all U.S. district court cases that involve a complaint for 
infringement.106 DocketNavigator compiles data on every 
electronically available patent complaint dating back to 2008.107 
Our dataset therefore starts with cases filed on January 1, 2008; 
we extend the analysis through December 31, 2015.108 Our unit 
of analysis is patent-case, meaning that each observation is one 
case filed in district court for a unique patent. Put another way, 
each observation in our database is a single litigated patent. If 
the same patent is subject to two different lawsuits, we will have 
two observations in our dataset. Likewise, if one lawsuit involves 
multiple patents, we will have a separate observation for each 
patent involved in the suit.109 Our analysis focuses on utility 
patents.110 
 
 106. Specifically, we searched for all cases that contained document types 
“complaint–infringement” “complaint–infringement–ANDA” or “complaint–
infringement–BPCIA.” Of course, the patents involved in any particular case 
were not necessarily raised in the original infringement complaint. They may 
have been brought up, for example, in a counterclaim for infringement. But, we 
expect such cases to be somewhat uncommon, and further when they are 
present, they should fit well into our mold. They themselves are patent 
assertions, and would be separated out into separate patent-case observations, 
to be matched with any IPX or IPR that is filed by a litigation party (in this 
case, the original plaintiff). 
 107. PATENT LIBRARY SCOPE OF DATA, 
https://compass.docketnavigator.com/help/scope.html (explaining how 
DocketNavigator has some data all the way back to 2000, but we use variables 
for which they only have comprehensive data from 2008 onwards). 
 108. Technically, DocketNavigator has cases much more recent than 2015, 
but our end date was set by two constraints. First, as detailed later, we needed 
to stop collection of litigation cases at some point earlier than our IPR end date 
to avoid truncation. That is, we wanted every litigation case in our sample to 
have sufficient time to observe whether an IPR was filed. Second, the dataset 
on patent assertion entities—a core part of our analysis—only spans through 
2015, meaning we would have dropped any litigation cases past 2015 in our 
eventual analysis anyway. 
 109. When splitting a single case into multiple observations for every patent 
at issue, our dataset imputes the date of the initial complaint on each patent. 
Because patents may be added to one case at different times, this date might 
not be representative of the actual date that each particular patent was asserted 
in litigation. We noticed that in a few percent of our cases, the attributed 
litigation date was earlier than the issue date of the patent. Looking at a sample 
of docket sheets, this tended to happen when a patent was under review when 
the litigation was filed, but added to the litigation shortly after it was issued. 
We correct for this by replacing the case “filing date” with the issue date of the 
patent whenever the issue date is later than the case filing date. 
 110. We drop patents with “D” or “P” in the name, to focus on utility patents. 
As a practical matter, many of these patents would be excluded from our later 
analysis in any case due to a lack of covariates that cover these patents in the 
datasets that we use. 
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Next, we construct a dataset of administrative patent 
challenges. For the purposes of this study, we focus only on inter 
partes reexamination and inter partes review. IPX filings are 
identified via the PatEx database,111 where they are coded as 
children in the “Continuity Data” dataset, with the prefix “95.” 
This source gives us the filing date of each IPX and its associated 
patent. We collected data on IPRs from DocketNavigator, in a 
similar method to that used by Vishnubhakat et al.112 This 
provides us with the patent number and filing date for each IPR 
challenge.113 Our available data spans all IPX and IPR 
challenges filed between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 
2018. 
The core question we seek to answer is which litigation cases 
led to the filing of an IPX or IPR challenge, and which did not. 
Therefore, for each district court patent-case we look to see if we 
can match it with an IPX or IPR involving the same parties. This 
matching process may not always be one-to-one. A single district 
court case may well lead to several administrative challenges—
perhaps each defendant files her own challenge, or one 
defendant files multiple challenges.114 On the other hand, 
defendants in multiple cases might band together to file one 
IPR.115 To handle this complexity, we first generate each 
pairwise match of district court and IPX/IPR based on the patent 
at issue. For example, imagine patent A was litigated three 
times—cases 1, 2, and 3—and was challenged twice, once each 
in IPX and IPR. Our pairwise matching would first generate six 
“potential matches”: case1–IPX, case1–IPR, case2–IPX, case2–
IPR, case3–IPX, and case3–IPR. Therefore, we identify every 
 
 111. PatEx is a comprehensive database with a range of bibliographic data 
on public patents. Public patents are those released in Public PAIR, a subset of 
the private PALM. This is a dataset of over nine million patents, through 
December 2014. See Stuart J.H. Graham, et al., The USPTO Patent 
Examination Research Dataset: A Window on Patent Processing, 27 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 554 (2018). 
 112. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 59–60 (discussing 
inter partes review). We further collapse any IPR filings that were filed on the 
same date, requesting the review of the same patent, and filed by the same 
party to one observation. This eliminates double counting of any challenges that 
were split up into separate filings, for example, to skirt the page limit. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 47 (noting that “multiple petitions against a patent may be 
filed by the same or different parties”). 
 115. See id. (noting that “a single petition may be filed or joined by multiple 
parties”). 
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possible match combination of district court cases and 
administrative challenges. 
Of course, not every possible combination is a true match 
that we care about. Instead, we want to limit to the case where 
one party asserts a patent in district court, and a defending 
party then challenges the patent in IPX or IPR. As a preliminary 
matter, we drop any possible matches where the administrative 
challenge in question was filed prior to the matched district 
court case.116 Next, we compare the parties in each case directly. 
For IPX, data on challengers are not electrically available. 
Instead, we examine over 1000 potential matches by hand, 
reading the IPX docket to identify the challengers. IPR parties, 
by contrast, are electronically available in the DocketNavigator 
data, so we can make use of electronic matching.117 In either 
case, we code a match whenever at least one of the parties 
requesting an administrative challenge is also a party to the 
district court litigation. 
Figure 1 plots the lag (in days) between the filing date of the 
district court case118 and the filing date of the administrative 
challenge for cases with matched parties.119 Unsurprisingly, we 
see large spikes in the days leading up to 365, or one year. IPR 
challenges, by statute, must be filed within one year of a party 
being sued in district court. Still, approximately fifty percent of 
 
 116. While it is possible that sometimes in one unique dispute the IPX or 
IPR could come first—by an alleged infringer anticipating or prompting a later 
infringement suit, Vishnubhakat et al. suggest that such cases are rare. See 
Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 76. More often, cases where the 
administrative challenge precedes the litigation case are likely to simply be 
false positive matches—unrelated cases. 
 117. We use exact matches, under the theory that party names are 
consistently written in the DocketNavigator database, which is also the source 
of our litigation data. To test this, we also perform a “fuzzy match” by 
identifying a subset of cases that have partial character matches, and then 
matching those by hand. In our test, we identify an extremely small false 
negative match rate—around two percent—so we use the exact matching for 
the whole set. 
 118. We make one small modification to the case filing date when we move 
from case to patent-case observations. The case filing date is constant for each 
patent within a case number, even though patents might be added to the case 
at varying times. In the unlikely case where a case was filed prior to the 
issuance of the patent, we know that the patent was not actually asserted in 
district court until after it was issue, so we recode the effective case filing date 
to be the patent issue date. 
 119. A small number (about ten percent) of matches had extremely high 
lags—over one thousand days. We omitted these observations from the 
histogram to get a better view of the shape of most of the distribution—but we 
discuss those observations with high lags in the following sentences. 
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our matches have a lag greater than 365 days. As Vishnubhakat 
et al. note, some of this is likely due to parties requesting IPR 
later than one year by virtue of latching on to an earlier case.120 
In our dataset, though, most of this is likely due to IPX matches, 
which have no such one-year restriction. Still, nearly ninety 
percent of our matches had lags of eighteen months or fewer. 
 
Figure 1: Lag Between District Court and IPX/IPR Filing for 
Cases with Matched Parties 
 
 At some point, of course, lags become so high that it is hard 
to consider the litigation case and the administrative challenge 
as part of the same dispute, even if they involve the same 
parties. Parties may litigate one case to completion, and then 
years later may request an administrative challenge as part of 
another case, or in the absence of a case. In one extreme case, we 
found that parties to litigation requested an administrative 
challenge nearly ten years after the litigation complaint was 
filed. To increase our confidence that the administrative 
challenge is part of the same dispute, we restrict to matches with 
lags equal to or less than eighteen months, which allowed us to 
 
 120. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 78 (noting that 
“challenges filed more than one year after the last federal court lawsuit . . . are 
likely to reflect either non-standard petitioners and/or petitioners seeking 
joinder to earlier petitions”). 
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retain eighty-seven percent of our matches as occurring within 
the same dispute. 
Next, we merge our identified matches back with our 
broader litigation sample.121 As constructed, there are 63,006 
patent-case observations in our dataset. In total, 7.5 percent of 
district court patent-cases actually led to an administrative 
challenge filing. Figure 2 plots the frequency of cases in our 
sample over time. Overlaid on this chart is the frequency of cases 
where we determined that an administrative challenge was filed 
by the parties (a confirmed match). The vertical line indicates 
the date of the AIA policy change: the switch from IPX to IPR. 
 
Figure 2: Litigation Filings With and Without an 
Administrative Challenge over Time 
 
The number of litigation cases increased dramatically in our 
sample period. The shape of administrative challenge curve 
appears to loosely follow the litigation curve. The fraction of 
cases where an administrative challenge is used over the entire 
period is about eight percent. We are interested to see whether 
this fraction is about even over the period or changes over time. 
Table 1 breaks down the rate of administrative challenge by 
 
 121. Recall, some litigation cases may have led to more than one confirmed 
IPX or IPR match. Because we care about litigation level data for this study, we 
collapse these to a binary indicator of whether or not the case led to at least one 
administrative challenge. 
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year. We test the difference between the fraction of challenges 
each year, and the fraction in 2008. 
 
Table 1: Rate of Administrative Challenge by Year 
Year Percent of Cases with an 
Administrative Challenge 
Total Cases 
2008 3.09% 4,016 
2009 3.43% 4,174 
2010 3.30% 5,308 
2011 3.82% ** 6,889 
2012 4.00% *** 11,194 
2013 9.58% *** 11,718 
2014 12.81% *** 9,688 
2015 12.02% *** 10,019 
2008–2015 7.49% 63,006 
*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from 
2008 at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
The rate of administrative challenge remains between three 
and four percent of cases between 2008 and 2012, but then more 
than doubles in 2013. The stars in Table 1 indicate statistical 
significance of tests of proportion equality between 2008 and 
each subsequent year. While no significant differences are 
observed for 2009 or 2010; each year following that date: 2011, 
2012 (the IPR transition year) and each IPR year is significantly 
different from 2008.122 Indeed, at least facially, the use of 
administrative challenges seems to have increased dramatically 
in recent years. Still, we hesitate to tell any sort of causal story 
based solely on this graph. These results could be driven by 
changes in other determinants of administrative challenge—
that is, the types of patents litigated after 2012 could be 
 
 122. The difference in the IPR transition year might be driven by increased 
challenges in IPR, but in fact there were few IPR challenges in 2012. In fact, 
the rate of IPX appears to have increased in this year, perhaps because parties 
were aware of the switch from IPX to IPR, and some desired to request IPX 
before the policy change. 
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somehow systematically different from those litigated before. We 
attempt to separate theses underlying characteristics from the 
AIA regime switch using multivariate regression in Part VII, 
infra. 
B. CASES WHERE CHALLENGES ARE UNAVAILABLE BY STATUTE 
Because we care about the choice to use post-grant 
administrative challenges, we also separate out cases where an 
administrative challenge was legally unavailable. During the 
IPX regime, patents that were filed before November 29, 1999, 
could not be challenged.123 These patents could, however, be 
challenged in the newer IPR regime.124 Therefore, we isolate 
cases where a lawsuit was filed before the IPR regime 
(September 16, 2012)125 and the patent at-issue was filed before 
November 29, 1999. In these cases, at the time that the 
defendant was hauled into court, she was not able to request an 
administrative challenge.126 Over seventeen percent of cases in 
our sample meet these criteria. That means that in nearly one-
fifth of cases where patent defendants did not request an 
administrative challenge, they were statutorily ineligible to do so. 
Table 2 presents a revised yearly challenge rate restricting 
only to eligible cases. When considering only cases that were 
eligible for an administrative challenge, the use of 
administrative challenges appears slightly larger: 9.4 percent of 
eligible cases involved an administrative challenge.127 Still, the 
general trend remains: the fraction of eligible cases with an 
administrative challenges nearly doubles between 2008 and 
 
 123. See MPEP § 2601, supra note 48. 
 124. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82. 
 125. See MPEP § 2601 supra note 48. 
 126. Of course, there is a nuance here: If a party was sued between 
September 16, 2011 and September 15, 2012, the party would not have been 
eligible for any existing administrative challenge at the time of the complaint, 
but would have become eligible for IPR within the one-year time bar once IPR 
became effective. For purposes of statutory ineligibility, we focus on the fact 
that at the time the case was filed, administrative challenges were not an option 
for the defendants. Without having the challenge tool at its disposal at the start 
of the lawsuit, a party might start down a different path that makes it irrelevant 
if that tool appears later on. Further, we observe that IPR was barely used at 
all in its first few months of operation, suggesting that litigants actually in this 
position did not flock to IPR in large numbers immediately after it popped up. 
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 98, at 13. We discuss the 
possible implications of this nuance on any interpretation of an AIA effect more 
generally in Section VII.A. 
 127. See Table 2 infra. 
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2015.128 For the remainder of this analysis, we restrict to only 
cases where defendants were statutorily eligible to request an 
administrative challenge at the time of the case filing. 
 
Table 2: Rate of Administrative Challenge by Year for Eligible 
Cases 
Year Percent of Eligible 





2008 6.39% 1,941 
2009 6.34% 2,254 
2010 5.45% 3,213 
2011 6.17% 4,263 
2012 5.18% ** 8,651 
2013 9.58% *** 11,718 
2014 12.81% *** 9,688 
2015 12.02% *** 10,019 
2008 –2015 9.12% 51,747 
*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from 
2008 at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
C. THE SKEW FROM DEFENDANT JOINDER 
When looking at “case-level” data, one other wrinkle bears 
noting. The patent-case observations are defined as a unique 
patent litigated in a unique case number. That is, if a patent is 
simultaneously litigated against five defendants under one case 
number, it is treated as one observation. On the other hand, if 
that same patent is simultaneously litigated against those same 
five defendants—but under five different case numbers—it will 
be treated as five observations. This technical change can yield 
 
 128. Interestingly, the rate of administrative challenges was actually 
slightly lower in 2012 than 2008. One possible contributing factor is that once 
the IPR effective date (September 16, 2012) was hit, the denominator—the 
number of eligible litigation cases—likely increased due to the removal of the 
statutory restriction. 
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very different case numbers and challenge rates for situations 
that are actually quite similar. If one defendant in the first 
example requests an IPR, then the challenge rate is 1/1, or 100 
percent. If the same defendant requests a challenge in the 
second situation, the challenge rate is only one-fifth, or twenty 
percent. This difference is particularly pronounced given one 
change in the America Invents Act. Section 299 of the Act 
requires a higher standard to join multiple defendants in one 
case than that they are simply accused of infringing the same 
patent.129 This raises the bar from the earlier, often loosely 
interpreted, standard for joining defendants under Rule 20 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.130 The expected effect, of 
course, is more case numbers after the AIA. 
The challenge behavior of co-defendants may well affect the 
behavior of a particular defendant. That is, if another defendant 
in a swatch of simultaneous infringement actions decides to 
request an IPR, you may benefit from their challenge, and decide 
not to request your own. There are positive externalities to 
administrative challenges for co-defendants—if one defendant 
manages to invalidate a patent at the PTO, it is invalid and thus 
unenforceable against all defendants. In the pre-AIA system, 
defendants tended to be clumped together under one case 
number, while post-AIA each defendant more likely appears 
under a separate case number. Therefore, to compare challenge 
rates more meaningfully, we ask whether at least one defendant 
in the case requested a challenge. 
In Table 3, we attempt to control for this change by 
collapsing together cases with simultaneous defendants.131 That 
is, any cases where the same patent is asserted on the same day 
and in the same court are treated as one case. In the earlier 
example, this means that the patent asserted simultaneously 
against five defendants would count as one case, regardless of 
 
 129. See Multi-Defendant Joinder Under the America Invents Act: Much Ado 
About Nothing?, JDSUPRA (Dec. 20, 2012), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/multi-defendant-joinder-under-the-americ-
97136/ (“Section 299 permits joinder only where the claims against the 
defendants arise out of ‘the same transaction . . . .’”). 
 130. See id. (“Prior to passage of the AIA, district courts typically applied 
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine when permissive 
joinder was appropriate in a patent infringement suit.”). For the importance of 
considering and accounting for joinder on analyses of patent litigation that may 
be affected by the AIA change, and support for the proposition that this change 
lead to increased numbers of cases as defendants were sued separately, see 
Cotropia et. al., supra note 14. 
 131. See Table 3, infra. 
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whether each defendant was assigned her own case number. 
Administrative challenge by any of the five defendants would 
yield a 100 percent challenge rate for that case. Table 3 also 
presents the deflation from this change—i.e., the percent by 
which our observations dropped when collapsing simultaneous 
patent assertions.132 
 
Table 3: Rate of Administrative Challenge by Year Collapsing 
Simultaneous Defendants 










2008 6.72% 1,829 5.77% 
2009 6.49% 2,173 3.59% 
2010 6.09% 2,873 10.58% 
2011 7.07% 3,593 15.72% 
2012 7.10%  5,383 37.78% 
2013 13.52% *** 6,570 43.93% 
2014 16.26% *** 5,955 38.53% 
2015 16.03% *** 5,753 42.58% 
2008–2015 11.29% 34,129 34.05% 
*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from 
2008 at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 132. See Table 3, infra. Note that deflation is calculated relative to the 
dataset just before patent assertions on the same day and in the same court are 
collapsed. Thus, it is the percent difference between the case numbers in Table 
2 and Table 3. 
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Overall, the size of the dataset decreases by about one-
third.133 While a full causal evaluation of the effect of the AIA 
switch from the Rule 20 standard is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the composition of the caseload is consistent with its 
expected effect. Treating simultaneous assertions as one case 
only reduced the general caseload in 2008 by about five percent; 
in 2013 this change decreased the caseload by over forty 
percent.134 Indeed, the incidence of simultaneous assertion 
under separate case numbers appears much greater post-AIA 
than before.135 Still, the general rise of administrative 
challenges—while elevated in magnitude when collapsing 
cases—follows roughly the same pattern. The difference from 
2008 becomes statistically significant the same year we see the 
largest rise—nearly a doubling —from 2012 to 2013.136 
Because we seek in part to compare pre- and post-AIA 
periods, we maintain this collapsed level of observations for the 
remainder of our analysis.137 Further, this level of analysis helps 
by making sure that the non-challenged case numbers of a 
challenged patent do not mask its status as a challenged patent. 
To be clear—for the remainder of the analysis, we no longer refer 
to a case as a unique patent-case combination. Instead, when we 
say “case,” we refer to a unique patent, litigated in one court, 
against any number of parties, on a unique date. 
D. SETTLEMENTS 
Cases that result in an administrative challenge might be 
different from other cases because they chose an administrative 
challenge rather than a court challenge, or because the 
defendants attempted to adjudicate validity at all as opposed to 
settling early. As established in other literature, most patent 
cases do not reach a final determination on the merits.138 
Therefore, cases with an administrative challenge occupy a 
 
 133. See Table 3, supra. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. See also Cotropia et. al, supra note 14, at 666 (finding that a 
difference between 2,520 patent infringement lawsuits in 2010 and 5,187 patent 
infringement lawsuits in 2012 “is largely explained by the AIA change in joinder 
rules”). 
 136. See Table 3, supra. 
 137. When collapsing in this way, nearly all patent covariate will stay the 
same because they do not change across observations that share a patent, 
litigation date, and court. To the extent that these cases have multiple judges, 
the judge from the case listed first in the dataset is chosen. 
 138. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 41. 
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portion of a special subset of cases that proceed meaningfully 
toward a validity challenge.139 As a next step, it is important to 
ask whether cases with administrative challenges differ further 
from cases that did move meaningfully toward adjudication, but 
remained in the district court. 
We look now to each case’s duration: the time between a 
case’s filing date and the date of its eventual termination (in 
days). While we are not able to identify the precise outcome for 
our cases—settlement, dismissal, or otherwise—we can compare 
those cases that ended quickly, versus those that lasted longer. 
Figure 3 presents a histogram of the case duration for our non-
challenged but eligible cases. 
 
Figure 3: Time Between Case Filing and Termination for Non-
Challenged Cases 
 
Any attempt to draw a line between “early” and “non-early” 
termination is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but we use one 
year as the divider for a key reason. Because IPR requests must 
be filed within one year of the litigation date,140 cases that 
continue on beyond one year have presumably chosen to 
 
 139. Note that the filing of an IPX challenges should usually result in a 
validity determination. By contrast, an IPR petition may itself settle, and may 
not always lead to a decision on validity. Still, parties who chose to file an IPR 
clearly took some steps towards adjudicating the validity of a patent, while 
parties who settle very early may have taken none at all. 
 140. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
2020] ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT CHALLENGES 241 
continue the case in district court, instead of requesting an 
administrative challenge. By contrast, cases that terminate in 
one year—without requesting an administrative challenge—
settled or otherwise resolved the case before a decision had to be 
made on requesting an administrative challenge. For IPX, the 
lines are less clear-cut, but the general principle remains; we 
also use one year as our threshold for cases in the IPX period for 
consistency. 
Over half (fifty-eight percent) of our cases that did not lead 
to an administrative challenge were resolved early. That is, 
many cases do not lead to a challenge request simply because the 
cases are not long in dispute—they settle quickly or resolve 
quickly. Because only a minority of cases continue beyond one 
year to even begin to seriously adjudicate validity, the 
proportion of cases that use administrative challenges, 
conditional on attempting to adjudicate validity at all, is higher 
than the unconditional proportion. 
In the remainder of this piece, we seek to identify how 
various characteristics are associated with the decision to 
request an administrative challenge in litigation. Along the way, 
we check for robustness of results within this more narrowly-
defined subset of cases that did not terminate quickly. That is, 
for some future analyses, we restrict our “non-challenged” set to 
only those cases that proceeded on in the district court for longer 
than one year. 
In closing, we note that while this adjustment is aimed 
primarily at settlements, it may also help to reduce other sources 
of potential complication and redundancy in the dataset. As the 
previous subsections have demonstrated, litigation data can be 
extremely complicated and interconnected; what we might 
substantively consider a single “case” could appear as many 
observations in our initial dataset. To the extent that these 
multiple observations use the same filing date and appear 
within the same court, the adjustment in Section IV.C can 
mitigate this issue. But further complexity could arise if cases 
appear multiple times upon being transferred from one court to 
another, if multiple cases appear both independently and 
consolidated, and any other technical changes that could further 
lead to repetition. The alternate dataset created in this Section 
(and used in some of the later analysis) could at least partially 
reduce the effect of these complications, by removing “non-
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challenged” cases that are marked with early termination dates 
due to transfer or consolidation.141 
V. HOW MUCH DOES THE INFRINGEMENT VENUE 
MATTER? 
A. VARIATION BY COURT 
Our data on litigation filings includes the district that the 
lawsuit was filed in. The distribution of cases among districts is 
highly concentrated. There are ninety-two unique districts 
represented in our sample. If cases were uniformly distributed, 
we would expect to see just over one percent of the total cases 
occurring in each district. This is not the case. The vast majority 
of districts in our sample see an extremely small fraction of 
patent cases. Only twenty-four districts see greater than one 
percent of the cases. Two districts alone hear over one quarter of 
all challenge-eligible patent cases; the District of Delaware and 
the Eastern District of Texas each heard about fifteen percent of 
the cases in our sample. 
An interesting question, of course, is whether there are 
substantial differences in administrative challenge rates across 
districts. Table 4 presents the challenge rate for each of the 
twenty-five most common districts in our sample. 
 
Table 4: Rate of Administrative Challenge by District 
Court Number of Cases Challenge Rate 
DED 5,465 13.52% *** 
TXED 5,128 15.00% *** 
CACD 2,255 10.69% 
NJD 2,223 7.24% *** 
CAND 1,861 17.62% *** 
 
 141. Note that the dataset restriction in this Section only applies to the set 
of cases that are not matched to a challenge within 18 months. Because our goal 
is to identify all cases where a challenge was filed, dropping cases that are 
matched to a challenge because the district court case also terminated early 
would exclude many challenges from our analysis. It would also have the 
paradoxical result of dropping from the analysis challenges where a defendant 
quickly requests a challenge, puts forth strong evidence of invalidity, perhaps 
leading to the institution of an IPR, and the plaintiff subsequently drops the 
infringement suit. Still, in the context of reducing dataset complexity and 
redundancy, this approach leads to a limitation. Cases that are transferred 
quickly but also lead to a challenge, for example, could still appear twice in the 
dataset, and would be coded both times as having led to a challenge. 
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ILND 1,777 7.71% *** 
NYSD 1,043 5.56% *** 
FLSD 912 2.63% *** 
VAED 750 13.07% 
CASD 739 11.91% 
MAD 718 16.16% *** 
UTD 640 7.50% *** 
FLMD 567 8.47% ** 
MND 546 12.82% 
TXND 509 10.02% 
MIED 477 11.95% 
MOWD 422 1.66 *** 
NVD 416 9.38% 
GAND 407 9.34% 
TXWD 364 17.03% *** 
OHND 347 8.07% * 
COD 345 5.51% *** 
WAWD 332 5.72% *** 
WIWD 314 14.65% * 
TXSD 306 16.99% *** 
National Average 34,129 11.29% 
*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from 
the national average at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
The variation in administrative challenge use across 
districts is substantial. While the Northern District of California 
sees administrative challenges in nearly one out of every five 
cases, the Western District of Missouri sees challenges in fewer 
than one out of every fifty. The District of Delaware and the 
Eastern District of Texas—by far the two most common districts 
in our sample—both have rates of administrative challenges 
that are slightly higher than the national average. As shown in 
Table 5, we regress all districts on whether or not each case 
involved a challenge. Using an F-test, we can strongly reject the 
hypothesis that all court coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
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Table 5: F-Test for Joint Significance of Courts 
 Test (Num., DoF) F-Statistic 
Court FE F(91, 34037) 8.05 *** 
Notes: An OLS model was run where the dependent variable 
is “challenged”; challenged cases are those where the litigated 
patent was matched to an IPX or IPR occurring within 18 
months. “Non-challenged” cases are those that could not be 
matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within 18 months). The 
model included dummies for 91 courts (one was omitted to run 
the regression) and a constant. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
But who would really expect differences across courts to be 
driven by random chance? On the contrary, a growing body of 
scholarship has documented the phenomenon of “court 
shopping.”142 Therefore, the parties and cases that select into a 
particular court might be quite different from those who select 
another. For example, patentees who choose to bring their 
infringement suits in district X might be particularly eager to 
settle the case, preempting any administrative challenge. These 
differences in selection might lead to a higher or lower challenge 
rate not because of anything the court did, but simply by virtue 
of the types of cases the court attracts. 
Still, characteristics of a particular court may well affect a 
defendant’s decision to bring suit. In IPR the decision of whether 
to grant a stay of the district court action is discretionary. Courts 
that are particularly hostile to stays might see fewer 
administrative challenges filed for their cases. Likewise, courts 
that are known to have a particular competency or speed for 
handling patent cases might obviate the need to go to the patent 
office to get a fair and speedy validity decision. In any event, the 
effects of the court’s policies from the selection effects are 
difficult to disentangle. In the next subsection we tackle this 
problem by focusing not on courts, but on particular judges—
where there is likely high heterogeneity in practices but lower 
selection bias. 
 
 142. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 99. 
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B. VARIATION BY JUDGE 
While “court shopping” in patent litigation is substantial, 
“judge shopping” appears to be largely nonexistent. As Professor 
Anderson has noted, most districts have put in place some 
procedures to reduce or eliminate a party’s ability to select a 
particular judge.143 With the possible exception of the Eastern 
District of Texas—where procedures may actually encourage 
judge shopping—litigants file an infringement suit without 
knowing who their judge is going to be.144 Therefore, we are 
relatively less worried that observed differences in 
administrative challenge rates across judges are driven by 
differences in the cases to which they are assigned. Of course, 
this is conditional on the court—we are interested in differences 
in judges within the same court; differences in judges from 
different courts would be marred by the same “court shopping” 
selection bias as before. 
We test this hypothesis by running a series of F-tests of the 
joint significance of judge dummies within each of the most 
common 25 courts. Because the composition of courts changes 
over time, we also control for litigation quarter to reduce the 
concern that any significance of judge dummies might be 
attributable solely to changes in the challenge rate over time. As 
shown in Table 6 below, we can strongly reject the hypothesis 
that all judge coefficients are jointly equal to zero for all but two 
courts. That is, even within a particular district, the judge 
assigned is associated with the odds that a defendant requests 
an administrative challenge. This is also true for the Eastern 
District of Texas—lending questions as to whether or not judge 
selection plays a role in challenge decisions. Some patentees who 
are particularly opposed to administrative challenges, for 
example, might file in the Eastern District and select the judge 






 143. See J. Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas, 
48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 539, 544 (2016) (describing how random assignment usually 
limits judge shopping). 
 144. See id. at 546 (explaining that the Eastern District of Texas has 
modified its assignment procedure so as to “create a means of judge shopping”). 
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Table 6: F-Test for Joint Significance of Judges Within 
Various Courts 
 Test (Num., DoF) F-Statistic 
DED F(27, 5394) 7.01 *** 
TXED F(20, 5070) 8.33 *** 
CACD F(48, 2173) 1.57 *** 
NJD F(28, 2102) 4.17 *** 
CAND F(37, 1753) 5.03 *** 
ILND F(51, 1672) 1.96 *** 
NYSD F(52, 959) 2.40 *** 
FLSD F(28, 852) 1.89 *** 
VAED F(17, 701) 6.76 *** 
CASD F(17, 688) 2.96 *** 
MAD F(24, 647) 5.39 *** 
UTD F(16, 589) 1.74 *** 
FLMD F(27, 507) 2.77 *** 
MND F(15, 493) 7.99 *** 
TXND F(12, 460) 3.04 *** 
MIED F(30, 407) 2.93 *** 
MOWD F(12, 388) 28.40 *** 
NVD F(13, 371) 1.992 ** 
GAND F(19, 356) 1.67 ** 
TXWD F(16, 314) 1.66 * 
OHND F(16, 299) 3.12 *** 
COD F(21, 293) 2.01 *** 
WAWD F(12, 288) 4.46 *** 
WIWD F(5, 277) 0.34 
TXSD F(15, 258) 3.42 *** 
Notes: Each row reflects the result of an F-test for the joint 
significance of judge dummies in an OLS model that was run 
using only the observations associated with each court. The 
dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are those 
where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR 
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those 
that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within 
18 months). Each model included quarterly FE, judge FE and a 
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constant. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. 
 
Still, many judges in other districts—presumably those who 
were assigned to the parties at random—have differences in the 
rate at which their cases use administrative challenges that are 
unlikely to be explained by random variation. These differences 
could be explained by the broad power judges have over their 
cases and the many different ways they might push litigation 
defendants into particular strategies. As Professor Anderson 
notes, experienced trial litigators know that the judge assigned 
is extremely important.145 Now, we dig deeper to test potential 
sources of this observed heterogeneity among judge assignment. 
Put simply, we seek to shed light on the following question: why 
does the particular judge assigned matter to defendants? 
One explanation could be the judge’s propensity to grant 
stays. If a certain judge is especially hostile toward granting a 
stay, we might expect that defendants would be less likely to 
request an administrative challenge for fear of having to incur 
duplicate costs as both proceedings move forward. It is difficult 
to empirically test for the effect of a judge’s stay propensity for 
two reasons. First, there is data sparsity: because 
administrative challenges are rare, motions for stay pending IPX 
or IPR are also relatively rare, and thus many judges would see 
few if any such motions. Second, such analysis would likely 
suffer from a reverse causality problem: higher stay grant rates 
might imply higher challenge rates, but the request of each 
challenge could drive up the judge’s grant rate. 
Still, much of the difference might not be specific to 
administrative challenge stays, or even to patent law. Instead, 
whether a defendant chooses to request an administrative 
challenge might be informed by the judge’s general docket 
management. A particular judge might move extremely quickly, 
pushing parties into quick settlements, or resolving key issues 
on early motions to dismiss. Such judges might not take kindly 
to delays of any kind, including stays pending patent office 
review of validity. 
 
 145. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 143, at 544 (“Litigators report that the 
judge assigned to a case can be the key to winning that case.”). 
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VI. HOW MUCH DOES THE PATENT AT-ISSUE MATTER? 
Most variables of interest to us are patent-specific; we make 
use of several other datasets to gain information on the patent 
at-issue in each observation. To obtain data on each patent, we 
combine data from a variety of databases, each of which is put 
out by the USPTO. For example, Patent Examination Research 
Dataset (PatEx)146 provides basic information such as filing 
date, patent grant date, and patent class.147 We separate out two 
characteristics for future analysis: patents issued to small 
entities and patents owned by PAEs. 
A. INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS 
First, we focus on characteristics that are present at the 
time of a patent’s issuance, and that do not change throughout a 
patent’s life. These are often referred to as “intrinsic 
characteristics” in the literature.148 Table 7 describes the 
intrinsic characteristics of the patents at-issue in our 
constructed challenged and non-challenged case samples. We 
also perform tests comparing the means between the challenged 
and non-challenged subsets.149 In every observable category, the 
patents at-issue in cases that led to an administrative challenge 












 146. See Graham, et al., supra note 111. 
 147. See generally NBER PATENT DATA PROJECT, 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads/patn-data-
description (providing a system, used by this paper, which accounts for changes 
in patent classes using “six NBER Technology categories,” because “the USPTO 
continually revises the technology classes”). 
 148. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 29. 
 149. More specifically, we perform two-sample two-tailed t-tests of equality 
for continuous variables (e.g. citations), and similar tests of proportion equality 
for binary variables (e.g. small entity status). 
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Table 7: Intrinsic Characteristics of Challenged Patents 
 Non-Challenged Challenged p-value 
Total claims 27.872 30.129 0.000 *** 
Independent 
claims 3.910 4.246 0.000 *** 
Min. word in 
ind. claims 125.373 128.723 0.020 ** 
Back citation 




79.595 67.773 0.000 *** 
Chemical  0.045 0.039 0.099 * 
Computer & 
Comm. 0.425 0.514 0.000 *** 
Drugs & 
Medical  0.205 0.135 0.000 *** 
Electrical & 
Electronic  0.097 0.148 0.000 *** 
Mechanical  0.095 0.056 0.000 *** 
Others 0.133 0.108 0.000 *** 
 
We obtain data on patent claims from the Patent Claims 
Research Dataset.150 This dataset provides the number and word 
count statistics for both independent and dependent claims. 
Following the researchers who created this dataset, we focus 
primarily on the number of independent claims and the 
 
 150. Patent Claims Research Dataset, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patent-
claims-research-dataset. 
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minimum word count in independent claims.151 Their theory is 
that patents with more independent claims and a smaller 
minimum word count should be of broader scope.152 This makes 
intuitive sense. We would expect additional claims to add 
additional scope of protection. Likewise, there is good reason to 
believe that claims with few words are broader than claims with 
more words. Just as “a paper” is a broader description than “a 
law review paper.” For completeness, we also use a measure of 
total claims in some of our analysis, which we generate by 
summing the dependent and independent claim counts. 
Challenged cases involve patents with, on average, two more 
claims and 0.3 more independent claims. While this tends to 
imply patents of greater breadth, challenged patents tend to also 
have a greater minimum number of words in their independent 
claims, which might conversely signify a narrower scope. 
The USPTO Patentsview Database153 allows us to find the 
number of backward citations, which is commonly used as a 
proxy for patent value.154 From this database, we extract files 
detailing every time one patent cites another patent. Backward 
citations are generated by tabulating, for a particular patent, the 
number of other patents it cites.155 Following Lanjouw and 
Shankerman,156 we generate per-claim variants for backward 
citations, as well as for prosecution time. Challenged patents 
spend less time in their initial examination—eight fewer days 
per claim—but also cite a greater number of prior art patents in 
the examination process. 
The breakdown of technology categories is also quite 
different between the two groups. Challenged cases involve a 
greater fraction of computer & communication patents, and 
electrical & electronic patents. The opposite is true for chemical, 
drugs & medical, mechanical, and other patents. 
 
 151. See Alan C. Marco, Joshua D. Sarnoff & Charles deGrazia, Patent 
Claims and Patent Scope, 48 RES. POL’Y 103790 (2019). 
 152. Id. 
 153. PATENTSVIEW, http://www.patentsview.org/web/#viz/comparisons. 
 154. See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, Federic M. Scherer & Katrin Vopel, 
Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights, 32 RES. POL’Y 
1343 (2003). 
 155. We manually set the value of backward citations to zero for any patent 
with no record of citations. 
 156. See Lanjouw & Shankerman, supra note 30, at 134. 
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B. ACQUIRED CHARACTERISTICS 
In Table 8, we present a similar analysis for “acquired” 
characteristics of the patent at the time of litigation. 
 
Table 8: Acquired Characteristics of Challenged Patents 
 Non-Challenged Challenged p-value 
Age 





0.206 0.229 0.022 ** 
Assigned 0.529 0.563 0.000 *** 
 
First, we define age as the number of days between the date 
that a patent is issued and the date it is litigated. There is no 
significant difference in age between patents in cases with or 
without an administrative challenge. Next, we create a measure 
of forward citations by summing the number of times a 
particular patent is cited by another patent.157 Forward citations 
are recorded as the total citations that accrued as of a particular 
date (December 26, 2017). This creates a truncation issue with 
forward citations since older patents have had more time to 
accrue citations. To alleviate this problem we normalize the 
number of citations by the number of years between the patent’s 
issue date and the date we collected forward citations.158 The 
combination of these two transformations results in the new 
 
 157. This data is also pulled from the PatentsView database. We manually 
set the value of forward citations for any patent with no record of citations, as 
this database is comprehensive for patents issued from the 1970s through the 
end of 2015. 
 158. There seems to be no perfect way to correct for truncation. See Bronwyn 
H. Hall, Adam B Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citation Data 
File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools (NBER Working Paper No. 
8498, 2001) (illustrating limitations of different methods, including the “fixed 
window” approach). Our data only includes total citations on a specific date, 
which is why we correct for truncation by finding the annual average. If 
citations increase at an increasing rate, we might be somewhat 
underestimating annual citations for younger patents. This concern is 
alleviated in our analysis because we later match patents using filing date and 
patent class. 
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forward citations variable “annual citations per claim.” 
Challenged patents have, on average, slightly higher forward 
citations. This might indicate that they are of particularly high 
value.159 
Finally, we seek to determine whether or not a patent was 
assigned prior to litigation. In earlier work, Professor Chien 
found that assignment was an important predictor of 
litigation.160 We seek here to see whether it is also an important 
predictor of administrative challenge. We merge our existing 
dataset with the Patent Assignment Dataset which records the 
assignment dates for patents.161 Our ability to determine the 
identity of the assignee is very limited. We narrow down as best 
we can to those assignments that appear to most closely 
resemble a true sale of a patent to another entity. We exclude 
any assignments tagged as name changes, government or 
security interests, corrections, and mergers. Likewise, we 
exclude any assignment that the PTO has flagged as likely from 
an individual inventor to her employer. Over half of all cases in 
our sample dealt with patents that had been assigned prior to 
litigation. Cases where there was an administrative challenge 
dealt with a greater share of patents that were assigned. 
 
C. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
While the t-tests for comparisons of means presented in this 
and the previous section offer some insights for how these groups 
differ, each of the variables in that table is compared 
independently of other variables. Now we perform more rigorous 
analysis using multivariate regression that accounts for possible 
correlations between the variables. Specifically, we use these 
regressions to identify the variables that predict whether a 
particular litigated patent will also be administratively 
challenged. The dependent variable takes the value 1 for our 
challenged group (patent-cases that are matched to an 
administrative challenge within eighteen months) and 0 for the 
control patents (patent-cases eligible for an administrative 
 
 159. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The 
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009); 
Harhoff, Scherer & Vopel, supra note 154, at 1345. 
 160. Chien, supra note 29, at 303–04. 
 161. See Alan C. Marco et al., The USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset: 
Descriptions and Analysis (USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2849634. 
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challenge but with no such challenge filed within eighteen 
months). 
Unlike some previous literature that looks at the 
characteristics of litigated patents using matching 
techniques,162 we are able to make use of our full sample, and 
with a smaller control set, finding good matches to all challenges 
might not be feasible. Matching is useful in cases where a binary 
outcome is rare, which could introduce bias in certain kinds of 
statistical analysis, as well as making data gathering and 
computation costly.163 When comparing litigated patents to the 
millions of unlitigated patents, the former dwarfs the latter: 
indicating that matching is necessary.164 By contrast, we 
compare challenged cases to other litigated cases, which are 
decidedly less rare. About eleven percent of the cases in our 
sample are challenged, which is about five to ten times greater 
than the proportion of patents that are litigated.165 Where the 
previous authors also used their matching technique to control 
for cohort and class effects,166 we instead use fixed effects to 
control for these effects over the entire sample. 
In Table 9, we present the results of this exercise, using a 
linear probability model (ordinary least squares regression on a 
binary outcome). All columns use fixed effects for the district 
court.167 Column (1) uses the intrinsic patent characteristics as 
 
 162. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Shankerman, supra note 30; Chien, supra note 29. 
 163. See generally Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare 
Events Data, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 137 (2001) (examining techniques for statistical 
analysis of rare events). 
 164. See Chien, supra note 29, at 309 (citing King, supra note 163, at 138). 
(“I used these sets, rather than a random sample drawn from patents generally, 
because the application of statistical analysis to rare events like patent 
litigation tends to distort and understate the probability that the events will 
occur.”). 
 165. See Ansell et. al., 2018 Patent Litigation Study, PWC (2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-pwc-patent-
litigation-study.pdf (figure 1, showing that the ratio of number of patent cases 
filed each year to the number of patents granted in that same year is about 1:50 
to 1:100 during the period of our study). 
 166. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Shankerman, supra note 30, at 133. 
 167. We cluster our standard errors at the district court level and at the 
patent level (some patents appear multiple times in our sample). For examples 
of clustering in similar contexts, see generally Alma Cohen & Crystal S. Yang, 
Judicial Politics and Sentencing Decisions, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON POL’Y 160, 
173 (2019) (using bootstrapped standard errors stratified by district court for 
various models with court or judge fixed effects, and noting that “results are 
robust to clustering standard errors at the district level”); Will Dobbie et al., 
The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 
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well as dummies for the patent filing year and NBER technology 
category to control for possible cohort and technology area 
effects. Column (2) adds in the acquired patent characteristics. 
Column (3) adds indicators for small entity patents and PAE 
plaintiffs, which are discussed in more detail in the following 
subsections. Finally, Column (4) adds fixed effects for district 
court judges. In the Appendix, Table A2 repeats the analysis of 
Table 9, but replaces NBER categories with USPC classes to 
more granularly control for class effects. Table A3 repeats the 
analysis of Table 9, but removes from the set of non-challenged 
cases those cases that terminated early. 
In general, many of the bivariate differences between 
challenged and non-challenged cases that we saw in the 
preceding sections do not appear as significant in the 
multivariate models. For example, in some specifications, 
independent claims or minimum words in independent claims 
show up significant or marginally significant (and in a direction 
that would support a positive relationship between broader 
scope and challenges), but this result is more often insignificant. 
We believe that much of this disparity between the bivariate and 
multivariate statistics can be attributed to systematic selection 
across courts and time.168 That is, while the broad pool of 
challenged patents has indicators of higher value or broader 
scope via claims and citation metrics compared to the broad non-
challenged pool, our models suggest that this is substantially 
 
201 (2018) (using court by time fixed effects along with a judge instrument and 
two-way clustering by judge and individual); Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence 
from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1342 (2014) (using district-court fixed 
effects and noting that “[a]ll standard errors are clustered at the district 
courthouse level to account for serial correlation”). In implementing the models 
with several levels of fixed effects and clustering on two variables, we use the 
estimator described by Correia. See Sergio Correia, Linear Models with High-
Dimensional Fixed Effects: An Efficient and Feasible Estimator (Working paper 
2017), http://scorreia.com/research/hdfe.pdf. In addition to the package by 
Correia, our analysis (performed in Stata 14) and the creation of the tables and 
figures presented throughout this Article were aided by several specialized 
packages. See Ben Jann, Making Regression Tables Simplified, 7 THE STATA J. 
227 (2007); Michael Stepner, BINSCATTER: Stata Module to Generate Binned 
Scatterplots, Statistical Software Components S457709, Boston College 
Department of Economics (2013); Roy Wada, OUTREG2: Stata Module to 
Arrange Regression Outputs into an Illustrative Table, Statistical Software 
Components S456416, Boston College Department of Economics (2014). 
 168. We found claims and citations results, in particular, to be sensitive to 
the addition of time and court fixed effects and appropriately clustered errors. 
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driven by where and when the patent is litigated. Therefore, 
caution is needed when interpreting the bivariate results. 
Our results that might speak to patent quality do so 
ambiguously. On the one hand, we find that patents with a 
greater number of backward citations—which could indicate a 
more diligent search effort—are more likely to be challenged, 
although their significance is reduced in several models, 
particularly when controlling for USPC classes.169 On the other 
hand, the amount of time (per claim) that a patent spent being 
prosecuted at the patent office appears negatively associated 
with challenges. If we believe that more time at the patent office 
is associated with a more thorough examination of the patent, 
we might expect that the patents with higher prosecution times 
are of higher quality.170 
Compared to other patents, litigated drugs & medical 
patents are significantly less likely to be challenged in most 
specifications, as are mechanical patents, though the latter loses 
significance in the face of judge fixed effects. On the other hand, 
litigated computers & communications and electrical & 
electronic patents are significantly more likely to be challenged. 
This might indicate that norms have been established in various 
industries—or their respective bars—for how patent disputes 
will play out. Another important factor could be differences in 
the original patent examination process by technology class. 
Certain areas might have differences in how likely prior art is to 
be found during the examination process. This result might also 
indicate the perceived incremental benefit of Administrative 
Patent Judges (APJs) as decision makers in various contexts. 
Defense attorneys might worry more about the prospect of 
explaining a computer or electronic invention to a generalist 
district court judge or jury than the same for a drug or 
mechanical patent. Or, on the flipside, APJs in the former two 
fields might be perceived as especially fair or skilled. 
Importantly, Table A3 shows that the majority of the results 
above still hold when comparing challenged cases to only cases 
 
 169. Another possible interpretation of backward citations is that a smaller 
number of backward citations may indicate that “the invention is in a relatively 
new technology area,” which would imply here that patents in new technology 
areas are less likely to be challenged. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 
30, at 141. 
 170. Note, however, that one study found that examination time is not a 
significant predictor of Federal Circuit patent validity decisions. See Ronald J. 
Mann & Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent 
Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMP. L. STUD. 1, 19–21 (2012). 
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that did not terminate early. In other words, the effects of many 
patent characteristics cannot be explained by differences in 
settlement rates. Even compared to cases that proceed 
meaningfully toward adjudication in the district court, patents 
involved in challenged cases tend to cite more prior art, spend 
less time under prosecution, are less likely to be drug or 
mechanical patents, and are more likely to be electrical patents. 
Still, when restricting the set of non-challenged patents, we also 
see several different results. Compared to the set of longer-
lasting non-challenged patents, challenged patents are less 
likely to be chemical patents but no more or less likely to be 
computer patents. They are also more likely to be younger, and 
to have been assigned at the time of litigation. 
Most notably, when removing those non-challenged patents 
that settled or otherwise terminated within one-year, annual 
forward citations per claim are positively associated with the 
probability of challenge, and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. While earlier work has shown that litigated 
patents are of higher value compared to the overall population 
of U.S. patents,171 our analysis here further suggests that 
patents concurrently challenged at the patent office tend to be 
even more valuable than other litigated patents, when the latter 
continue on in the district court beyond one year. Because the 
set of litigated patents that continue in district court beyond one 
year is meant to exclude those patents that settled early 
(choosing neither adjudication at the patent office nor 
meaningful adjudication in the district court), we believe this 
comparison is well suited to address the core substitution 
hypothesis172 that underlies much of the possible welfare effects 
from administrative challenges. That is, this model is focused on 
patents for which it seems most likely that the parties faced a 
choice to adjudicate validity at the patent office versus at the 
district court, potentially saving cost and time.173 
 
 171. See, e.g. Chien, supra note 29, at 326 (“All other things equal, valuable 
patents are more likely to be litigated.”). 
 172. See generally Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9. 
 173. Of course, this interpretation rests on several large assumptions. First, 
we assume that both those cases where an administrative challenge is filed and 
those cases that are pending in the district court for more than one year reflect 
a meaningful step toward adjudication of validity. Recall that we do not drop 
any challenged patents, even if the district court case that they arose from 
terminates within one year. The theory behind this differential treatment is 
that the substantial work that does into filing an IPX or IPR petition represents 
a meaningful step toward challenge to validity that is more analogous to a court 
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This result could have several interesting implications for 
policymakers. The increased value of these patents likely also 
indicates that there is more “at stake” in the dispute.174 On its 
face, if policymakers hoped to push the validity challenges in 
especially high-stakes disputes from the courts to the patent 
office, they appear to be succeeding. And, as the costs of 
litigation increase with the amount at stake,175 having the 
highest value patents bifurcating their trials to utilize the lower 
cost validity determination procedure could maximize the cost 
differential, and thus the cost savings, from these procedures.176 
Further, our results suggest important implications for 
overall patent quality. If we believe that the patent office is a 
more accurate judge of patent quality than the district courts, it 
might be comforting to know that the most valuable patents are 
being reviewed there. In addition, because evidence suggests 
that administrative review results in more decisions on validity 
than in the district court,177 we might expect the overall quality 
of the granted patent pool to rise. In short, policymakers might 
be relieved to discover that our findings lend some support to the 
 
case that proceeds for longer than one year. By contrast, we expect that many 
cases that terminate within one year would reflect quick settlement without 
incurring significant litigation costs, and thus a switch from the usual district 
court outcome to an administrative challenge could actually increase cost. Of 
course, we also assume that challenges are associated with cost savings at the 
district court. These assumptions would weaken substantially to the extent that 
(i) many of the administratively challenged cases are subsequently settled or 
dropped, which would make them more analogous to the early settled district 
court cases, (ii) many of the cases that proceed beyond one year in district court 
incur few costs or make no meaningful efforts toward adjudicating validity, or 
(iii) stays are not granted or requested, meaning that the challenged cases in 
our sample continue to run in parallel with their associated district court case 
and incurring both sets of costs. 
 174. Talia Bar & Jesse Kalinowski, Patent Validity and the Timing of 
Settlements, 67 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. (2019). (showing that when an infringer 
expects higher damages she would exert more effort searching for prior art in 
an attempt to invalidate a patent). One possible explanation for our observation 
that challenged patents are more likely to have more forward citations than 
other litigated patents is that a patent’s increased value is an indication of 
higher expected damages. 
 175. AIPLA REPORT, supra note 43, at 37–41. 
 176. This, of course, depends on the counterfactual of those cases which were 
selected into these challenges. It is possible that had administrative review not 
been available, the parties might have not adjudicated validity in the district 
courts at all, but rather settled. In this case, use of patent office challenges 
might be increasing the dispute costs borne on the parties. Further 
investigation into settlements is needed to shed light on this question. 
 177. See Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 110. 
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idea that administrative patent procedures may be diverting 
especially high value patents away from the district court. 
 
Table 9: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge 















     
Independent 
claims 
0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Min. word in ind. 
Claims/100 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Back citations per 
claim 
0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Prosecution per 
claim (years) 
-0.017*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Chemical -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
Computer & 
Comm. 
0.027** 0.024** 0.033*** 0.030*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Drug & Medical -0.026 -0.027* -0.036** -0.037** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Electrical & 
Electronic 
0.052*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
Mechanical -0.023** -0.023** -0.020** -0.014 
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 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age (years)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Forward Citations 
per year per claim 
 0.010 0.010 0.009 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Assigned  0.004 0.014 0.012 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Small entity 
indicator 
  -0.024** -0.021** 
   (0.011) (0.010) 
PAE   -0.040*** -0.035*** 
   (0.008) (0.009) 
Constant -0.084*** -0.041 -0.026 -0.018 
 (0.021) (0.060) (0.055) (0.053) 
Patent Filing Year 
FE 
Y Y Y Y 
District Court FE Y Y Y Y 
Litigation Quarter 
FE 
Y Y Y Y 
Judge FE N N N Y 
     
Observations 33,459 33,459 33,459 33,095 
R-squared 0.049 0.050 0.053 0.128 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases 
are those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or 
IPR occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are 
those that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR 
within 18 months). All models are linear probability models. 
Standard errors, clustered by district court and patent, in 
parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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C. SMALL ENTITY PATENTS 
Small-scale inventors and their relative standing compared 
to larger firms can have important implications for 
innovation.178 Earlier studies have shown, however, that small 
patentees are disadvantaged when it comes to protecting their 
patent rights.179 Professors Lanjouw and Schankerman find that 
patentees with small patent portfolios run a higher risk of 
litigation.180 Professors Schankerman and Galasso show that 
invalidation of patents owned by large firms induces more 
follow-on innovation by small firms,181 and further show that a 
loss of patent rights significantly increases the likelihood that 
small firms stop patenting.182 
As a preliminary matter, cases involving small entity 
patents made up over one-quarter (28.3 percent) of all cases with 
challenges. This number is slightly smaller than the proportion 
of small entity patents in non-challenged cases (32.7 percent); 
this difference is significant at the one percent level. In Column 
(3) of Table 9, we add to the model a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the patentee claimed small entity status. We 
find that cases involving small entity patents are significantly 
less likely to see concurrent administrative challenges. It is 
interesting that the patents that are shown to have a higher risk 
of litigation still have a lower risk of administrative challenge. 
It is also worth noting that because our dataset uses 
infringement suits, small entity patentees (to the extent the 
party asserting the patent is the same party that filed the 
patent) are likely to be the plaintiffs in the litigation case, and 
not the defendants. Therefore, defendants may be making 
strategic decisions to challenge small entity patents in the 
district court instead of at the patent office. Perhaps this implies 
that the types of challenges made to small entity patentees are 
those more amenable to district court challenge (i.e., challenges 
other than novelty or nonobviousness). Or, perhaps defendants 
 
 178. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that a 
disparity between large and small patent firms “will have implications for the 
industrial organization of innovative activity”). 
 179. Id. (finding that “small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in 
protecting their patent rights” compared to patentees with a large portfolio of 
patents). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative 
Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q. J. ECON. 317 (2015). 
 182. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Rights, Innovation and 
Firm Exit 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21769, 2015). 
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prefer to exploit the limited resources of small entity patentees 
by dragging out costly civil litigation instead of using the 
cheaper and faster administrative alternative so as to 
incentivize them to settle in terms favorable to the alleged 
infringers. 
We find that small entity patents are less likely to be 
challenged by defendants. This result on small entity patents is 
curious in light of a result in other work: small entity patents 
are more likely to be invalidated at the patent office.183 If small 
entity patents are easier to invalidate at the patent office than 
other patents, we might expect defendants to be challenging 
them much more frequently at the patent office. We could 
perhaps reconcile these results by the existence of settlements. 
Knowing that they face poor outcomes in administrative 
challenges, small entity patentees may be more likely to settle 
early and avoid the patent office altogether. 
Indeed, Column (3) of Table A3 is consistent with this 
hypothesis. When comparing challenged cases to those that did 
not challenge but did not terminate early, small entity status is 
no longer a significant predictor of challenge requests. That is, 
the difference in challenge rates for small entity patents appears 
to be driven by those cases that terminate early, likely often by 
settlement. This result adds to our understanding of how small 
entity patentees behave in patent disputes. 
D. CASES BROUGHT BY PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 
Significant work has been published in academic journals in 
recent years on the question of patent assertion entities, or 
PAEs.184 PAEs are often viewed to have different litigation 
strategies than other patent infringement plaintiffs.185 These 
strategies might lead to a different rate of administrative 
challenge use for defendants. 
We make use of the Stanford PAE dataset186 to identify 
cases where the plaintiff was a patent asserter. We follow Miller 
 
 183. See Bar & Costello, supra note 25, at 30. 
 184. See generally Mazzeo et al., supra note 103 (analyzing case outcomes to 
contribute data to this developing academic conversation). 
 185. Id. 
 186. We are grateful to Shawn Miller for sharing this data. Shawn P. Miller 
et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Dataset (Oct. 23, 2017) (draft) (on file 
with Stanford Law School) https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Introduction-to-the-Stanford-NPE-Litigation-
Dataset-10.23.2017.pdf. 
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et al.’s coding scheme and define PAE as a plaintiff that is a 
member of categories one, four, or five.187 Because the data 
provided to us is a ninety percent sample of the total caseload 
over our period, we make one additional assumption to maximize 
our data availability. We code patents that are missing for one 
of our cases in the PAE dataset but asserted by a PAE at some 
other time in that dataset as PAE asserted. Likewise, we assume 
that patents never asserted by a PAE in the dataset—that is, 
patents that were never asserted by a PAE over a fifteen-year 
period—are not owned by PAEs. 
As a preliminary matter, cases brought by patent assertion 
entities made up nearly one-third (31.9 percent) of all cases with 
challenges. This number is slightly smaller than the proportion 
of PAE patents in non-challenged cases (32.3 percent), but the 
difference is not significant. Thus, administrative challenges 
seem to be handling a significant number of PAE cases, though 
perhaps at a slightly lower rate than Article III courts are. To 
the extent that policymakers hoped for administrative 
challenges to serve as a second look at patents being asserted by 
PAEs, these tribunals appear to certainly be fulfilling that 
function. 
That said, these numbers don’t tell us if these cases are 
challenged with a lesser frequency because they are PAE 
patents. Rather, PAEs may own patents that are 
unrepresentative of the overall pool.188 The patents they hold 
may be more or less likely to be challenged simply by nature of, 
for example, having more citations or being in a certain art 
category. In Column (3) of Table 9, we attempt to separate out 
these effects by adding in a dummy for PAE status alongside our 
other covariates. Controlling for other patent and case 
characteristics, cases that involve PAE assertors are less likely 
to lead to an administrative challenge. 
One obvious explanation for this result is that PAE 
asserters might be more likely to force a quick settlement before 
adjudication proceeds at all.189 That is, defendants in PAE cases 
might settle before they even consider whether to request an 
administrative challenge. The results in Column (3) of Table A3 
are consistent with this theory. When restricting non-challenged 
cases to only those that last for longer than one year, the effect 
 
 187. Id. at 6. 
 188. See Cotropia et al., supra note 14, at 650–54 (explaining the difficulty 
in categorizing PAEs and their impact on the patent landscape). 
 189. See, e.g., Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 73 n.19. 
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of PAE is no longer statistically significant. That is, like with 
small entities in the previous subsection, the difference in the 
PAE litigation rate appears primarily driven by cases that settle 
or otherwise terminate early. 
VII. HAVE SELECTION PATTERNS CHANGED SINCE THE 
AIA? 
A. THE AIA AND THE RATE OF CHALLENGE 
The figures and descriptive tables in Section IV.A appear to 
show a significantly increased use of administrative review 
procedures in the latter half of our sample period. This begs an 
important question: did the America Invents Act and the shift to 
inter partes review make challenges more appealing to 
defendants? In the roughest of tests, we first divide our sample 
into two parts. First, defendants in cases that were filed prior to 
September 16, 2012 had inter partes reexamination available as 
a tool at the time the case was filed, but not inter partes 
review.190 Cases filed after that date, however, were no longer 
eligible for IPX, but could make use of IPR. Within our window, 
the rate of administrative challenge after the AIA is about 
double that of the challenge rate prior to the AIA. Table 10 
Column (1) presents the equivalent test in regression form, 
using an AIA dummy (IPR) and the usual court fixed effects. 
Of course, this two-period comparison is far from sufficient 
to establish a causal story for a number of reasons. First, 
dividing the sample into two halves might simply reduce a 
continuous trend to a “high” and “low” period. That is, the latter 
years would have been significantly greater following a growing 
trend of challenge use, regardless of whether the AIA was put 
into effect. 
Relatedly, litigation strategies can change over time. 
Indeed, the nature of our judicial system promotes changes in 
the backdrop of litigation over time as caselaw develops. 
Landmark cases may make it more difficult for challengers to 
introduce evidence of invalidity, or may make it more difficult to 
obtain stays. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that the 
decision to file for an administrative challenge depends on 
elements of the judicial system that are orthogonal to any 
 
 190. Supra Section II.A. Cases filed before but close to this date in theory 
could have still used IPR before the one-year statutory bar took effect. Still, the 
vast majority of cases in the first sample would be unable to do so. See also text 
accompanying note 126, supra. 
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particular case.191 In other words, the time at which a patent is 
litigated may affect the likelihood that an administrative 
challenge is filed. This could cast particular doubt on the 
interpretation of our IPR variable, since it is the only variable 
that changes with litigation timing. The variable, in particular, 
could just be capturing changes in baseline rates of 
administrative challenge, rather than any effect of the AIA in 
particular. 
Visually, Figure 4 shows the rate of challenges for each 
quarter in our sample.192 Separate trend lines are provided for 
the samples before and after the switch to the IPR regime. We 
see that the rate of challenges over the IPX period appears 
relatively constant over time, which is consistent with the lack 
of significant yearly differences from 2008 until 2013 in Table 
3.193 The IPR period, by contrast, is marked by a steeper slope of 
increasing challenge rates. Notably, the increase in the IPR 
period appears to level off after the first few quarters. As shown 
in Figure 5, if you remove the policy change quarter and two 
quarters before and after, the IPX and IPR periods appear to 
have very similar slopes, and the change appears to be a change 
in intercept. At the end of this Section, we discuss unique 
features of the quarters surrounding the policy change, and 
possible interpretations of the IPR effect as either a change in 
slope or a discontinuous jump with a several quarter delay. 
 
 191. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 99, at 635 (2015) (explaining factors that 
encourage forum shopping in district courts, despite uniform legal boundaries). 
 192. Note that Q3 2019 appears in this plot twice, separately for its IPX and 
IPR observations. 
 193. Note that this result is not in tension with the published statistics of 
increased yearly IPX filings over the same period, because they are measuring 
different things. See Section II.B, supra. Our analysis looks at the rates at 
which defendants file challenges, as a fraction of the total cases where the 
patent is statutorily eligible for an IPX challenge. To the extent that the number 
of IPX challenges increases, but there is also a corresponding increase in total 
eligible cases, the actual challenge rate may stay the same. 
2020] ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT CHALLENGES 265 
Figure 4: Challenge Rate by Litigation Quarter 
 
 
Figure 5: Challenge Rate by Litigation Quarter, Excluding 
Transition Quarters 
While our earlier models from Section VI used quarterly 
fixed effects to control for changes over time, the use of these 
fixed effects alongside our AIA indicator would be inadvisable. 
Because our AIA indicator is effectively equal to an indicator for 
all cases filed in Q4 2019 or later, it is highly collinear with the 
set of time fixed effects.194 Instead of fixed effects, Column (2) of 
 
 194. While the AIA indicator also extends slightly into Q2 2019, preventing 
perfect collinearity, the variance inflation factor on the indicator in a simple 
model with quarterly fixed effects is over 40. Models that attempt to use both 
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Table 10 adds to the model a linear time trend, as well as the 
time trend interacted with the AIA indicator to allow the trend 
to vary before and after the policy change.195 In the full sample, 
both the AIA indicator and the interaction term are positive and 
significant, which suggests that the AIA is associated with both 
an increased challenge rate and an increased acceleration of the 
challenge rate (increased slope). 
The other main issues with identifying an AIA effect can be 
broadly categorized under the heading of omitted variable bias. 
That is, the switch to AIA might have been correlated with 
changes in the set of patents or cases that were litigated. If, for 
example, the patents litigated after September 16, 2012, 
coincidentally had greater claims, the effect of greater claims 
(which is excluded in our first two columns) might be biasing the 
AIA effect upwards. This problem would be particularly 
pronounced if, for example, the AIA also changed the overall 
quality of the set of patents filed or patents litigated. 
To at least partially correct for this problem, in Column (3) 
we control for the same observable patent characteristics as in 
Column (4) of Table 9. Even simultaneously controlling for 
observable patent characteristics, court and judge effects, and a 
time trend, we still find a positive and significant effect of the 
AIA dummy and the interacted slope of the time trend. 
Appendix Table A4 presents results from additional models 
as robustness checks. Columns (1) and (2) reproduce Column (3) 
from Table 10 and mirror the earlier robustness checks set out 
in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. Even when replacing NBER 
categories with more granular patent classes or restricting the 
set of non-challenged cases to those that did not terminate early, 
the AIA dummy remains at least marginally significant and its 
interaction with time remains strongly significant. 
Using a time trend over the entire eight year sample could 
present two disadvantages relative to using time fixed effects. 
First, the legal landscape that impacts challenges decisions in 
2008 could be very different from the legal landscape in 2015, in 
 
the AIA indicator and quarterly fixed effects have varying significance on the 
AIA indicator and are sensitive to the inclusion of various controls and in 
particular the clustering of errors. 
 195. Of course, it is possible that using linear time trends could affect any 
AIA effect if the rate of challenges over time followed a higher order polynomial 
or non-parametric trend. We see little theoretical reason that over an eight-year 
period that challenge rates would remain relatively constant for about five 
years, increase rapidly coincidentally at the time of the switch from IPX to IPR, 
and then flatten out again. 
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ways that are not well captured by a time trend. Second, closer 
to the AIA policy change, the rate of challenges could have been 
growing at a steeper pre-existing trend that is not well fit by the 
time trend over the entire sample. In Columns (3)–(5) of 
Appendix Table A4, we restrict the sample to narrower windows 
around the policy change, starting with eighteen months (on 
either side of the switch to IPR) and then shrinking to twelve 
and six months, respectively. While the AIA dummy is no longer 
significant in the eighteen and twelve month windows, the 
interaction with the time trend remains strongly significant. In 
the narrowest 6 month window, neither the dummy nor the time 
trend come up significant 
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table A5, we reproduce Columns 
(2) and (3) from Table 10, except that we replace the AIA dummy 
and time trend with a full set of quarterly fixed effects to observe 
more flexible patterns over time. With controls, the signs of the 
fixed effects in the IPX period are mixed, and none of the 
quarters are statistically significant (relative to a base quarter 
of Q1 2008). Starting in Q4 2012, the first full quarter in the IPR 
period, all quarterly fixed effects are positive and significant (at 
least at the 10 percent level). The magnitudes and significance 
of the coefficients increase notably in Q2 2013. 
Taken together, the results of these models support the 
visual observations from Figure 4. We do not see evidence that 
the switch to IPR resulted in an immediate, discontinuous jump 
to a higher rate of challenges. Rather, we see support for a policy 
change that was either gradual or had a delayed effect. In the 
narrow windows right around the policy change, we see little 
discernable difference in the challenge rate. In the subsequent 
progression of months, however, we see that the use of 
challenges is increasing more quickly than the pre-policy trend. 
We suggest two possible explanations for the timing of this 
effect. First, there are two reasons to believe that the effect of 
the policy indicator is clouded in the period surrounding the 
actual policy change. First, as noted earlier in this Section, while 
September 16th, 2012 was the first date on which a defendant 
would have IPR available the instant they are sued, defendants 
who were sued in the year prior to this date in theory could still 
request an IPR when it became available. Therefore, cases in the 
last few quarters of what we have coded as the IPX period can 
be linked to IPR, rather than IPX, challenges. Further, since 
parties were on notice for a full year that the change from IPX 
to IPR was coming, there might have been selection around the 
policy change. Certain plaintiffs may have timed their lawsuits, 
268 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
for example, to fall before or after the policy change. Lastly, one 
of the AIA policy changes (the change in the denials standard) 
took effect a year before the switch to IPR, and thus a portion of 
the overall policy effect was already in place in the year prior to 
the IPR period.196 Taken together, these factors might partially 
explain the lack of significance in the narrowest window in Table 
A4. 
More broadly, defendants may have been hesitant to make 
use of IPR right after it became available. Risk averse 
defendants or their counsel may have preferred to observe the 
first few outcomes of IPR before making use of this new tool. 
Similarly, they may have preferred to observe whether certain 
courts would be willing to grant stays before instituting an IPR 
alongside their parallel litigation case. This could explain both a 
gradual adoption of IPR, as well as a dichotomous jump several 
periods after the policy change. The former would be consistent 
with parties having different thresholds of comfort with IPR, and 
the latter would be consistent with a tipping point where enough 
information on the outcomes or court treatment of IPR for 
parties broadly to respond to the policy change. 
As discussed in Part II, the IPX regime differs from the IPR 
regime in many ways.197 These changes were motivated at least 
in part by a desire to make administrative challenges more 
appealing to litigants.198 The data presented in this Part 
suggests that this goal has been achieved. When subjected to 
more rigorous analysis, the visual observation of increasing 
filings post-AIA holds up to scrutiny. Despite an apparent 
delayed or gradual effect, rates of administrative patent 
challenges in the years following the switch to IPR ar higher for 
patents litigated after to the AIA took effect, even when 
controlling for a variety of other variables that predict these 
challenges. To the extent that policymakers hoped that the AIA 
would increase the use of administrative challenges, our results 





 196. Supra Section II.C. 
 197. See Section II supra. 
 198. Id; See also Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 65 (“In 
general, the AIA’s legislative history indicates Congress wanted both IPRs and 
CBM reviews to serve as a substitute for Article III litigation over patent 
validity.”). 
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Table 10: AIA Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES AIA Indicator Add Trend Add Controls 
    
AIA 0.075*** 0.034** 0.040** 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.018) 
AIA*Trend  0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.068*** 0.073*** -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.053) 
Patent Filing 
Year FE 
N N Y 
Patent Controls N N Y 
District Court 
FE 
Y Y Y 
Judge FE N N Y 
Time Trend N Y Y 
    
Observations 34,129 34,129 33,095 
R-squared 0.034 0.037 0.126 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases 
are those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or 
IPR occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are 
those that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR 
within 18 months). The “AIA” variable is an indicator that takes 
the value “1” if the patent case was filed after 9/16/2012, and “0” 
otherwise. Columns (2)–(3) include a linear time trend based on 
filing dates, in days and centered around 9/16/2012, as well as 
an “AIA*trend” variable that interacts this trend and the “AIA” 
indicator. Columns (3) includes the full set of controls from 
Column 4 of Table 9, excluding quarterly FE. All models are 
linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by district 
court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
B. THE AIA AND THE TYPES OF CHALLENGES 
A more interesting question for policymakers is whether the 
AIA increased the use of administrative procedures evenly 
across the board, or if it instead made these challenges more 
attractive for certain types of patents. That is, the effects of 
patent-level variables may be different within the IPR regime 
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compared to the IPX regime. Characteristics that predict 
administrative challenge overall may be better or worse 
predictors within the IPR or IPX regimes. This could suggest 
that the AIA’s changes to these procedures changed the type of 
patents that were selected into IPR versus IPX. 
To investigate these effects, Table A6 reproduces the main 
model from Table 9, run separately on the subsamples before 
and after the policy change. We observe that several variables 
that are statistically significant predictors of challenges in the 
IPX period are not significant predictors of challenges in the IPR 
period, and vice versa. Indeed, the only variable that is 
significant at the 5 percent level in both subsamples is 
prosecution time, which is negatively related to the odds of 
challenge. 
There is some evidence that patent scope, via the minimum 
word count measure, matters within the IPX period (in the 
direction of broader patents being more likely to be challenged), 
but the same effect is not significant within the IPR period. The 
same is true of mechanical patents, which are less likely than 
other patents to be challenged in the IPX regime. On the other 
side of the coin, computer & communication and electrical and 
electronic patents are significantly more likely to be challenged, 
but only in the IPR regime. 
Importantly, the small entity effect—that small entity 
patents are less likely to be challenged administratively—is only 
significant in the IPR subsample. As one possible explanation, 
we consider the changes in the cost structure from IPX to IPR. 
The IPR process involves significant discovery and other trial-
like expenses. To the extent that small entities might settle early 
to avoid the costs of administrative challenge, where they face 
poor outcomes, this effect might be more pronounced in IPR if it 
is relatively more costly overall. We note further that the PAE 
indicator, which retains its negative sign and strong significance 
in the IPR period model, is only marginally significant in the IPX 
period model (at the 10 percent level), which could indicate the 
PAE effect is driven primarily by the IPR period. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the AIA may 
have altered the selection of patents into administrative 
challenge. To the extent that policymakers did not intend to 
change the composition of patents that are administratively 
challenged in this way, they should carefully investigate the 
mechanisms that led to this change. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The use of administrative validity challenges, while still low 
relative to litigation, increased significantly in the years after 
the AIA took effect. Use of these procedures by district court 
litigants may have significant private benefits in the form of 
reduced cost and increased speed.199 Likewise, these procedures 
promise substantial public benefits by fixing patent office errors, 
and increasing the quality of granted patents.200 If policymakers 
seek to increase the use of administrative patent challenges or 
to evaluate their effects, they must first understand how they 
are currently used. 
Other literature has well established that certain intrinsic 
and acquired characteristics of patents can predict litigation.201 
Because the vast majority of administrative challenges occur 
alongside litigation, it would not be surprising to find that these 
same characteristics predict administrative challenges 
compared to the overall pool of patents.202 Instead, we show that 
intrinsic and acquired characteristics are good predictors of 
administrative challenge even within the pool of already litigated 
patents.203 Compared to other litigated patents, litigated patents 
that are associated with an administrative challenge may be of 
even higher value (when considering only non-challenged 
litigated patents that are not settled early), are less likely to 
have been issued to small entities or held by PAEs, and are more 
likely to be computer or electronic patents and less likely to be 
drug patents.204 And finally, we confirm, quantitatively, the 
obvious visual observation: litigated patents are more likely to 
be challenged at the patent office after the AIA, and the switch 
to IPR, than before.205 But, the full story is more nuanced than 
an across-the-board increase: selection patterns appear to have 





 199. See Section I supra. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Chien, supra note 29. 
 202. See Section IV. See also Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9. 
 203. See Section VI supra. 
 204. See Section VII supra. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
272 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
Table A1: Comparing Litigation, IPX, and IPR207 
 
 207. The material in this table is cited appropriately when it is first 
presented. For clarity of the table, we do not include supra citations to each 
source again. This table was constructed by the authors. Still, it was inspired 
by similar tables constructed by other sources to compare these or different 
procedures. See PX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82 (providing a 
comparison of inter partes reexamination and inter partes review); See also 
Reexamination and its Interplay with Litigation, DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP 
(March 2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160812134841/http://www.ryuka.com/home/uplo
ads/pdf/Reexam_presentation.pdf (summarizing the procedural aspects of 
reexamination and a providing context and comparison to litigation and IPR 
procedures for invalidation). 
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Table A2: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge 
Using Patent Classes 














     
Independent 
claims 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Min. word in ind. 
Claims/100 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Back citations per 
claim 
0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Prosecution per 
claim (years) 
-0.011* -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age (years)  -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Forward Citations 
per year per claim 
 0.008 0.007 0.006 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Assigned  0.003 0.012 0.011 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Small entity 
indicator 
  -0.028*** -0.024** 
   (0.009) (0.010) 
PAE   -0.039*** -0.037*** 
   (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant -0.049** -0.001 0.016 0.019 
 (0.020) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) 
Patent Filing 
Year FE 
Y Y Y Y 
Patent Class FE Y Y Y Y 
District Court FE Y Y Y Y 
2020] ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT CHALLENGES 275 
Litigation 
Quarter FE 
Y Y Y Y 
Judge FE N N N Y 
     
Observations 33,435 33,435 33,435 33,069 
R-squared 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.164 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are 
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR 
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those 
that could not be matched (i.e. had no such IPX or IPR within 18 
months). All models are linear probability models. Standard 
errors, clustered by district court and patent, in parenthesis; *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
 
Table A3: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge: 
Excluding Non-Challenged Cases that Terminated Early 















     
Independent 
claims 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Min. word in ind. 
Claims/100 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Back citations per 
claim 
0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Prosecution 
per claim (years) 
-0.037*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.056*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Chemical -0.060* -0.060** -0.059* -0.065** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Computer & 
Comm. 
0.034 0.023 0.023 0.030 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
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Drug & Medical -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.109*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034) 
Electrical & 
Electronic 
0.066** 0.062** 0.063** 0.067** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Mechanical -0.066** -0.066** -0.066*** -0.062** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) 
Age (years)  -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Forward Citations 
per year per claim 
 0.024** 0.025** 0.025** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Assigned  0.037*** 0.036*** 0.027** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Small entity 
indicator 
  0.009 0.004 
   (0.016) (0.017) 
PAE   0.005 0.002 
   (0.011) (0.013) 
Constant -0.101*** -0.024 -0.027 0.001 
 (0.037) (0.066) (0.065) (0.068) 
Patent Filing Year 
FE 
Y Y Y Y 
District Court FE Y Y Y Y 
Litigation Quarter 
FE 
Y Y Y Y 
Judge FE N N N Y 
     
Observations 15,769 15,769 15,769 15,507 
R-squared 0.116 0.119 0.119 0.234 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are 
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR 
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those 
that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within 
18 months) and did not terminate before on year. All models are 
linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by district 
court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table A4: AIA Effects Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









      
AIA 0.042** 0.055* -0.000 0.018 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.030) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) 
AIA*Trend 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Constant 0.033 0.034 0.021 -0.061 0.051 
 (0.049) (0.063) (0.092) (0.111) (0.134) 
Patent  Class 
FE 
Y N N N N 
      
Observations 33,069 15,507 15,772 10,830 5,593 
R-squared 0.162 0.229 0.181 0.230 0.260 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are 
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR 
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those 
that could not be matched (i.e. had no such IPX or IPR within 18 
months), except for Column 2 which follows Table A3 and 
excludes non-challenged cases that terminated within one year. 
The “AIA” variable is an indicator that takes the value “1” if the 
patent case was filed after 9/16/2012, and “0” otherwise. All 
columns include a linear time trend based on filing dates, in days 
and centered around 9/16/2012, as well as an “AIA*trend” 
variable that interacts this trend and the “AIA” indicator. All 
columns also include the full set of controls and fixed effects from 
Column 4 of Table 9, excluding the quarterly FE.  Column (1) 
replaces the NBER categories with a full set of patent classes.. 
Columns (3)–(5) restrict the sample to 540, 360, and 180 days on 
either side of 9/16/12 (total widths of three years, two years, and 
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one year respectively). All models are linear probability models. 
Standard errors, clustered by district court and patent, in 
parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Table A5: AIA Effects Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Quarters Add Controls 
   
Q2 2008 0.033 0.032 
 (0.029) (0.037) 
Q3 2008 0.031 0.027 
 (0.037) (0.042) 
Q4 2008 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.025) 
Q1 2009 -0.016 -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.023) 
Q2 2009 0.018 0.032 
 (0.018) (0.022) 
Q3 2009 0.017 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.030) 
Q4 2009 0.032 0.037 
 (0.021) (0.029) 
Q1 2010 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.024) 
Q2 2010 -0.010 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.028) 
Q3 2010 0.035* 0.039 
 (0.019) (0.024) 
Q4 2010 0.000 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.024) 
Q1 2011 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.024) 
Q2 2011 0.015 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.023) 
Q3 2011 0.028* 0.043 
 (0.015) (0.026) 
Q4 2011 0.038* 0.044 
 (0.020) (0.031) 
Q1 2012 0.024 0.027 
 (0.021) (0.025) 
Q2 2012 0.008 0.018 
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 (0.013) (0.017) 
Q3 2012 0.028 0.029 
 (0.022) (0.028) 
Q4 2012 0.023* 0.043* 
 (0.013) (0.023) 
Q1 2013 0.030* 0.045* 
 (0.017) (0.024) 
Q2 2013 0.078*** 0.091*** 
 (0.022) (0.027) 
Q3 2013 0.085*** 0.089*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) 
Q4 2013 0.115*** 0.122*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) 
Q1 2014 0.115*** 0.126*** 
 (0.031) (0.035) 
Q2 2014 0.107*** 0.109*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
Q3 2014 0.096*** 0.108*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) 
Q4 2014 0.107*** 0.117*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) 
Q1 2015 0.100*** 0.117*** 
 (0.022) (0.035) 
Q2 2015 0.108*** 0.117*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) 
Q3 2015 0.124*** 0.121*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) 
Q4 2015 0.090*** 0.102*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) 
Constant 0.055*** -0.018 
 (0.014) (0.053) 
Patent Filing Year FE N Y 
Patent Controls N Y 
District Court FE Y Y 
Judge FE N Y 
   
Observations 34,129 33,095 
R-squared 0.040 0.128 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are 
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR 
occurring within 18 months. The models include quarter 
dummies, the first full quarter in IPR is Q4 2012. Column (2) 
includes the full set of controls from Column 4 of Table 9. The 
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models are linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered 
by district court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Table A6: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge: 
Before and After AIA 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IPX Period IPR Period 
   
Independent claims 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Min. word in ind. 
Claims/100 
-0.006** -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Back citations per claim 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Prosecution per claim 
(years) 
-0.022*** -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Chemical 0.001 -0.028 
 (0.016) (0.031) 
Computer & Comm. 0.006 0.051*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) 
Drug & Medical -0.022 -0.045 
 (0.016) (0.034) 
Electrical & Electronic -0.004 0.088*** 
 (0.014) (0.030) 
Mechanical -0.030** -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Age (years) -0.006* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Forward Citations per year 
per claim 
0.014* 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Assigned 0.002 0.017 
 (0.006) (0.014) 
Small entity indicator 0.002 -0.034** 
 (0.010) (0.016) 
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PAE -0.016* -0.053*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) 
Constant 0.058** 0.027 
 (0.028) (0.091) 
Patent Filing Year FE Y Y 
District Court FE Y Y 
Litigation Quarter FE Y Y 
Judge FE Y Y 
   
Observations 13,596 19,390 
R-squared 0.152 0.154 
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are 
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR 
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those 
that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within 
18 months). Column (2) covers cases filed on or after 9/16/2012, 
and Column (1) covers the remainder of our sample. All models 
are linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by 
district court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate 





















282 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
